



Instructor's Guide to Lawyers, Clients and Representation

Laboratory implementation, theoretical foundations,
experimental evidence, and variants

Behavioral and Experimental Economics Research Lab
Department of Economics



Revised edition | October 2026

<https://beer-lab.org/>

How to use this guide

This guide supports the preparation, implementation, and classroom discussion of the family of lawyers, clients and representation prepared for the Behavioral and Experimental Economics Research Lab (BEER Lab) at the Department of Economics of Tecnológico de Monterrey. It is intended for instructors with different levels of familiarity with experimental and behavioral economics.

The document offers three reading paths. The **quick guide** is enough to launch a session. The operational chapters explain each screen used by instructors and students. The conceptual chapters present the theories, predictions, and empirical findings needed to lead the post-game discussion.

Access instructions and common screens are explained once. Each variant then focuses only on what changes relative to the basic game: configuration, group size, decisions, predictions, relevant outcomes, and academic literature.

Author

This guide was prepared by Stanislaw Maldonado, research professor in the Department of Economics at Tecnológico de Monterrey, Monterrey Campus. For questions or suggestions about its content, please contact the author at stanislao.maldonado@tec.mx.

For the instructor

This guide follows the English-language interface. Spanish configurations use the same logic. Never project individual codes or connect outcomes to names, student identification numbers, or seats in the room.

Contents

How to use this guide	i
1 An activity about legal representation	1
1.1 Access through the updated laboratory website	1
1.2 Learning objectives and scope	5
1.3 Operational summary and access	6
1.4 Preparation and participant sequence	7
2 Incentives, information and predictions	15
2.1 Reconstructing balances and expected trial outcomes	15
2.2 Strategic offers, risk and the benchmark's limits	16
2.3 Professional information and decision authority	17
2.4 Evidence and relationship to the literature	18
3 Extensions and their comparisons	19
3.1 Procedure-based fees	19
3.2 Recovery-based fees	20
3.3 Private quality and direct client access	20
3.4 Binding delegation	23
3.5 Legal aid and uncertain enforcement	25
4 Teaching with the session's results	28
4.1 Revealing and reading the report	28
4.2 Class plan and discussion script	30
4.3 Data, operation and package completion	32

List of Figures

1.1	Current institutional website. Select CLASSROOM in the top navigation menu to open the teaching experiments. Captured on October 7, 2026.	1
1.2	Current catalog: search by title, topic, or JEL code. Then locate this family's card and select language and edition. Captured on October 7, 2026.	2
1.3	Demo contains only the configurations of this game family, in both languages and editions.	3
1.4	Rooms contains the four rooms for this family: basic and extended editions in Spanish and English.	3
1.5	Session-creation form for the basic English room. Check the selected configuration and participant requirement before creating the session.	4
1.6	Institutional welcome and confirmation of the participation rules.	8
1.7	Current instructions for the basic edition: initial resources, decision rules, and experimental units. Continuation 1/2.	9
1.9	Current comprehension check with an incorrect answer, its specific explanation, and retained responses.	11
1.10	Defendant's settlement offer.	12
1.11	Private lawyer advice with the offer and compensation rule.	12
1.12	Client's final choice after receiving advice.	13
1.13	Neutral waiting while another role completes its step.	13
1.14	Client outcome and individual accounting.	14
1.15	Explicit completion and sum of recorded case balances.	14
3.1	Lawyer advice under recovery-based compensation.	21
3.2	Client who observes the distribution but not actual case probability.	22
3.3	Lawyer who privately observes actual probability.	22
3.4	Client with direct access to the same probability as the lawyer.	23
3.5	Binding lawyer choice; the client does not submit a second decision.	24
3.6	Externally financed fee and explicit subsidy in the client result.	25
3.7	Trial victory and collection displayed as separate events.	27
4.1	Report before any cases are complete, with aggregates hidden.	28
4.2	Actual progress with completed cases and pending opportunities.	28
4.3	Revealed aggregate metrics with explicit denominators.	29
4.4	Mean role balances using consistent role colors.	29
4.5	Offer distribution with counts and percentages.	30
4.6	Case evolution; unfinished opportunities retain missing results.	30

An activity about legal representation

1.1 Access through the updated laboratory website

Start at <https://beer-lab.org/en/>. Select **CLASSROOM** in the top navigation menu; it opens <https://teaching.beer-lab.org/en/>. In the **Classroom experiments** catalog, use the search box to locate the activity by name. You can also filter by **Topic** or **JEL code**. Clear any filters left from an earlier search before looking for another game.

Each family's card distinguishes **Español** and **English** access links. The **Show extended version** checkbox selects that edition before following a link. Catalog language and session language are separate choices: verify both. Students use the room specified by the instructor; the instructor prepares and monitors the session through this family's own administrative pages.




Figure 1.1: Current institutional website. Select CLASSROOM in the top navigation menu to open the teaching experiments. Captured on October 7, 2026.



Figure 1.2: Current catalog: search by title, topic, or JEL code. Then locate this family's card and select language and edition. Captured on October 7, 2026.

Checking resources, comprehension, and participant requirements

Before opening the room, check the selected configuration and the number of students present. The session-creation form states the group size and minimum required by that configuration. An individual activity accepts any positive participant count; an interactive activity must satisfy its stated requirement: complete groups when size is fixed, or a minimum participant count when size is flexible. Requirements may change across treatments, for example when adding a third party or changing an institution's size. If you edit a grouping parameter, check the requirement for the edited configuration, rather than relying only on the demo's suggested count.

In the instructions, ensure that students can identify what each role receives, what they can decide, and how the outcome is calculated. An initial account, a distributable budget, and final earnings need not be the same amount. Refer to the resources panel and the example for the selected treatment. Do not carry the basic edition's endowment into a treatment that changes accounts or introduces additional positions.

ECU stands for *Experimental Currency Units*: the activity's unit of account. An outcome of 100 ECU does not automatically equal 100 pesos or 100 dollars. Conversion depends on the session configuration. Before announcing a payment, confirm with the laboratory whether money is paid, the conversion rate, and which decisions count for payment. In hypothetical modules, describe amounts as outcomes in the stated situation.

When a comprehension check is included, an incorrect response receives an explanation beside that question, identifying the submitted answer and the correct answer. Other answers remain in the form. Ask the student to return to the example, locate the relevant rule, and redo the calculation before correcting the response. Avoid revealing answers to the entire class for an individual error, and do not interpret a comprehension mistake as an economic choice in the game.

	Abogados, clientes y representación / Lawyers, Clients and Representation — BEER Lab Seleccione una variante de este juego. Select a version of this game.
grupo fijo	
grupos reasignados	
honorarios por trámite	
honorarios por cobro	
información del abogado	
información directa al cliente	
decisión delegada	
asistencia jurídica	
cobro de la sentencia	
fixed group	
reassigned groups	
procedure-based fees	
recovery-based fees	
lawyer information	
direct client information	
delegated decision	
legal aid	
judgment collection	

Figure 1.3: Demo contains only the configurations of this game family, in both languages and editions.

Rooms

Current rooms:

[ES] Representación: básica
[EN] Representation: basic
[ES] Representación: extendida
[EN] Representation: extended

Figure 1.4: Rooms contains the four rooms for this family: basic and extended editions in Spanish and English.

Room: [EN] Representation: basic

Create a new session

Session Config

Number of participants

Complete groups of 3 participants. Use a multiple of 3; minimum 3.

[Configure session](#) 

App sequence

legal_representation_game (10 rounds)

Figure 1.5: Session-creation form for the basic English room. Check the selected configuration and participant requirement before creating the session.

Downloading a session with several rounds

For the instructor

Open **Data** within the relevant session and use that session's CSV or CSV-for-Excel download link. The general export has one row per participant and columns for the different rounds. Ten rounds do not necessarily mean ten rows per person. When the family provides its own long-format export, observations may instead be organized by participant and round or another unit defined by the design.

Save the original file together with the configuration name, session code, and active-round count. Check that columns for the last active round are present and that the data belong to the selected session. Empty cells can represent inactive rounds, a pending decision, or a field that does not apply to a role; do not automatically recode them as zeros. To compare learning, preserve round and group identifiers alongside participant identifiers. Share only anonymous aggregates in class, and record session incidents before constructing derived tables.

1.2 Learning objectives and scope

Representation separates the person who bears a decision's consequences from the person who helps make that decision. A client may need professional knowledge to evaluate litigation, while the lawyer's remuneration may respond differently from the client's own balance. This activity makes that relationship visible through three simple choices: a settlement offer, advice and a choice between settlement and trial. Students reconstruct each role's incentives and distinguish information, authority and compensation. The exercise does not describe every feature of an actual judicial procedure or provide recommendations for handling a particular legal case. Its rules establish a controlled environment for reasoning about representation.

After participating, students should be able to calculate a settlement after fees, obtain the expected balance from trial, identify who knows the case probability and state who has the last word. They should also distinguish winning from collecting and separate transfers from costs. A new problem that changes an offer or probability can evaluate these skills. Remembering a treatment label contributes little if a student cannot explain which balance changes, which information is added and which choice becomes available. The exercises in this guide assess those capabilities by asking for accounts and decision trees, rather than assessing whether someone selected the instructor's preferred outcome.

This game belongs to the Law collection. Its interaction unit is a three-person group comprising a client, lawyer and defendant. The catalog also contains a principal-agent family about contracts and effort. This game does not elicit effort, select a professional from competing candidates or measure productivity. Its economic relationship arises within a dispute involving an offer, professional advice and an uncertain trial outcome. This boundary allows shared conceptual language without reproducing another field's activity. Nor does the exercise bargain over the initial assignment of property rights, which belongs to the following topic in the Law plan. Keep these distinctions explicit when presenting its learning objectives.

Theoretical foundation

Separate three questions before interpreting a choice: who knows, who receives payment and who decides? Superior information does not automatically confer authority. Receiving a fee does not uniquely determine what advice someone will give. A behavioral prediction requires the relevant account and assumptions about preferences.

The basic edition provides one case, ten cases with fixed groups and ten cases with reassigned groups. The extended edition adds seven treatments: procedure-based fees, recovery-based fees, private lawyer information, direct client information, delegation, legal aid and uncertain enforcement. There are seven configurations because the information extension requires a control with the same distribution of case quality. Both language interfaces cover all rules. They share mathematics and data structure. Language is not an economic treatment and should not be treated as a causal comparison between legal institutions. Instructors can choose an interface appropriate to the class without changing the monetary mechanism.

1.3 Operational summary and access

Field	Description
Purpose	Study settlement, incentives and information in legal representation.
Experimental unit	Three-person group: client, lawyer and defendant.
Participants	Positive multiple of three; reassignment requires at least two groups.
Basic edition	One case; ten cases with fixed groups; ten cases with reassigned groups.
Extended edition	Seven treatments: procedure and recovery fees, private and direct quality information, delegation, legal aid and uncertain enforcement.
Decision	Defendant offers 0–100 ECU, lawyer advises and client decides; delegation changes final authority.
Payoff	Each person starts each case with 100 ECU; transfers, fees and trial costs determine balances, which are added.
Topics	Legal representation; Fees and incentives; Client information; Delegated decisions; Settlement and enforcement.
JEL	K41; D82; D86; C92; A22.
Suggested duration	35–45 minutes for the activity, 60–80 with discussion; an estimate awaiting a classroom pilot.
Instructor report	Progress, offers, advice, settlement, disagreement, fees, role balances, subsidy, costs, victories, collections and case evolution.
Author and contact	Stanislao Maldonado; stanislao.maldonado@tec.mx .
Status	Locally validated package; public release awaits authorization and deployment.

Institutional access begins at <https://beer-lab.org/> and continues to <https://teaching.beer-lab.org/>. The portal and directory screenshots are reused from the previous package because those common pages do not change with this game. They explain navigation and do not demonstrate that this new catalog card is published. The proposed subdomain is <https://representation.beer-lab.org/>. The verified local entry during preparation is <http://localhost:8082/demo>. Instructors should communicate the address appropriate to the environment they are using and test it from another device before an in-person class. A localhost address works on the computer running the instance; other devices require an appropriately configured classroom or public host.

The proposed English basic room is <https://representation.beer-lab.org/room/represen>

tation_en. The other proposed rooms are https://representation.beer-lab.org/room/representacion_es, https://representation.beer-lab.org/room/representacion_extendido and https://representation.beer-lab.org/room/representation_extended. For the local instance, substitute <http://localhost:8082> and retain the room path. These are four stable rooms with distinct purposes, using a common application. Do not send students the administrative session-creation page. A room provides access to the session that the instructor has prepared. It is helpful to distinguish the permanent room address from an individual participant link, which belongs to a particular session and should remain private.

Demo displays twenty configurations, ten in each language. Each language has three basic modes and seven extended treatments. For an initial class, select one basic case and reserve a treatment for a later comparison. Ten fixed cases are more useful when the objective is to observe experience within a continuing group. Reassigned groups require at least two three-person groups to change partners. No effective reassignment occurs with only three participants. Roles remain fixed in all three modes, so differences over time do not combine learning the role with experience in another position. The classroom can discuss what continuing role experience preserves even when partners change.

Rooms presents the administrative forms for these entries. Each basic room contains only its three modes and defaults to one case in the indicated language. Each extended room presents its seven treatments. Check the complete name, language and participant count before creating a session. Creation rejects a count that is not a positive multiple of three, preventing incomplete groups from the outset. Six demonstration participants show two groups, but do not require a real class to contain exactly six people. With a larger class, the instructor should allow enough time for the slowest groups and arrange private support for anyone experiencing an access problem.

The local administrative demonstration uses admin/admin. These credentials belong to the preparation instance; a public installation must manage access under its operational rules. The instructor creates a session and obtains individual links or activates the room. Each student should use their own link and keep it private. Forwarding an active link may cause two browsers to operate on one participant record. Before beginning, ask participants to check the interface language and keep the window open. Staff should handle a late arrival without revealing group choices. A brief access check is preferable to discovering missing participants after the first decision has already been submitted.

For the instructor

Before class, open the exact configuration, walk through all three roles with a trial group and check the room in a separate browser. Record language, mode, group count and treatment. The public subdomain in this guide is a proposed deployment address, not a published route for this game.

1.4 Preparation and participant sequence

Welcome displays the laboratory logo, its purpose and the general participation rules. Students are asked to remain silent, decide individually and privately, keep the page open and consult staff if a problem occurs. They confirm that they have read these rules before advancing. This operational agreement preserves the communication channel specified by the mechanism. The lawyer's advice is structured communication inside the application; it does not authorize conversation outside it. Instructors should clarify this distinction if a student interprets their professional role as permission to speak to other group members. The role labels describe the decision sequence rather than an opportunity to improvise a negotiation.



Welcome to the BEER Lab

The Behavioral and Experimental Economics Research Lab in the Department of Economics at Tecnológico de Monterrey provides a space to learn about economic decisions through controlled activities.

- Remain silent and do not communicate with other people.
- Make decisions individually and privately.
- Follow the instructions on screen.
- Do not refresh, close or leave the page.
- If a problem arises, raise your hand and consult the staff privately.

☐ I have read the rules and wish to begin.

Begin

Powered by [oTree](#)

Figure 1.6: Institutional welcome and confirmation of the participation rules.

Instructions describe endowments, the claim, trial costs, the fee, victory probability, collection probability and final authority. The common example expressly concerns a fixed fee paid by the client. It should not be transferred automatically to another compensation rule. In a class using a recovery commission, ask students to recompute that example before starting. This verifies that they understand a share of the amount collected rather than a share of the endowment, claim size or winning probability. It also prepares them to read a decimal fee correctly when the offer is not divisible by five. The screenshot shows the opening portion of the instructions; the application includes the complete rule set below it.



Instructions

Resources and unit of account

Each begins with 100 ECU.

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

This session does not convert ECU into real money.

Your role: Defendant - Case 1 / 1

You will complete 1 case(s). Your role remains the same. Your group remains the same throughout this session.

Three people participate in each case: a client, their lawyer and a defendant. Each begins with 100 ECU. The claim is for 100 ECU. Endowments are renewed in each case, and case balances are added at the end.

The defendant offers a settlement between 0 and 100 ECU. The lawyer sends private advice to the client. The client decides to accept the offer or go to trial, unless these instructions expressly assign the decision to the lawyer.

At trial, the client and defendant each pay 15 ECU. If the client wins and collects, the defendant transfers 100 ECU to the client. Losing, or winning without collection, produces no such transfer. The trial cost is paid in all of these cases.

The lawyer receives a fee of 10 ECU, whether the settlement is accepted or the case goes to trial.

Comprehension requires three answers: maximum offer 100 ECU, trial cost 15 ECU per party and final authority. The client decides in every configuration except delegation, where the lawyer decides. An incorrect response returns a message asking the participant to review the rules. The data retain a count of incorrect attempts, without adding demographic variables. During a pilot, instructors can use recurring difficulties to improve the explanation. They should not discuss individual mistakes publicly or connect them to particular recommendations. The purpose of the check is to establish understanding before consequential choices, rather than to rank students by how quickly they proceed through the interface.

The defendant observes their offer, the final outcome and the fee rule. Private advice is never shown to the defendant. There are no free text messages between participants. Each case starts with information appropriate to the role. In the basic game everyone knows the 60% probability. In the quality treatments the lawyer observes 30% or 90%, while the client either knows only the distribution or also receives the actual value. The defendant retains the announced distribution and does not receive that private number. Once all three people reach the common gate, the defendant enters an integer offer between zero and one hundred. The application validates the limits and requires a response. An offer of zero is valid and differs from a missing decision. Group members who have already finished a step wait while the relevant role makes the next choice.

The lawyer sees the offer and selects settlement or trial advice. In the basic mechanism the advice

The defendant offers a settlement between 0 and 100 ECU. The lawyer sends private advice to the client. The client decides to accept the offer or go to trial, unless these instructions expressly assign the decision to the lawyer.

At trial, the client and defendant each pay 15 ECU. If the client wins and collects, the defendant transfers 100 ECU to the client. Losing, or winning without collection, produces no such transfer. The trial cost is paid in all of these cases.

The lawyer receives a fee of 10 ECU, whether the settlement is accepted or the case goes to trial.

The client pays the fee and the lawyer receives it. The lawyer retains their endowment and pays no additional trial costs.

The probability of winning is 60%, known to everyone.

After a victory, the probability of collecting is 100%. Everyone knows this value. The collection draw is independent of the victory draw.

Advice is nonbinding: the client makes the final decision.

The defendant observes their offer, the final outcome and the fee rule. Private advice is never shown to the defendant. There are no free-text messages between participants.

Example with the client paying a fixed fee: a settlement of 60 ECU gives the client 150 ECU, the lawyer 110 ECU and the defendant 40 ECU. A trial victory with collection gives 175, 110 and -15 ECU respectively. A negative defendant balance is allowed and represents a case loss; no real payment is required.

Continue

Con tecnología de [oTree](#)

Figure 1.8: Current instructions for the basic edition: initial resources, decision rules, and experimental units. Continuation 2/2.

does not alter the offer or bind the client. The client then sees the amount, fee rule and advice before deciding. They may follow the advice or select the alternative. The defendant waits and does not observe the recommendation. This separation is part of the mechanism: it studies advice without opening an additional negotiation about the message. The subsequent instructor report presents aggregates rather than individual messages. Students should understand that the choice recorded for the client, rather than the lawyer's recommendation, determines the basic game's outcome.

Results show the outcome and the participant's own role balance. Following trial, the page separates victory and collection. It reveals actual case probability for learning after the choice, while continuing to exclude advice from the defendant's page. The balance is decomposed into endowment, transfer, applicable cost and fee. A negative balance is possible for the defendant after losing and paying the full claim plus trial cost. It represents an ECU loss in that case, without requiring a student to make a real payment. Completion explicitly confirms that decisions are recorded and shows the sum of case balances. It asks for no additional response and allows students to wait for the instructor's discussion.



Review the marked questions. Each shows your answer and an explanation; your other answers are retained.

Check the rules

Resources and unit of account

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

This session does not convert ECU into real money.

Your role: Lawyer · Case 1 / 1

Advice is nonbinding: the client makes the final decision.

What is the largest permitted offer, in ECU?

Your answer: 101. The correct answer is 100. Review the instructions: maximum offer 100, trial cost 15 per party and authority as stated above.

How many ECU does each party pay at trial, including after a loss?

Who makes the final decision? Enter 1 for the client or 2 for the lawyer.

Continue

Con tecnología de oTree

Figure 1.9: Current comprehension check with an incorrect answer, its specific explanation, and retained responses.

Propose a settlement

Your role: Defendant · Case 1 / 1

Probability of winning this case: **60%**

After a victory, the probability of collecting is 100%. Everyone knows this value. The collection draw is independent of the victory draw.

If accepted, you transfer this amount. If trial is chosen, the offer is not paid and the trial rules apply.

Offer to the client, in ECU (0–100)

Continue

Figure 1.10: Defendant's settlement offer.

Send your advice

Your role: Lawyer · Case 1 / 1

Probability of winning this case: **60%**

After a victory, the probability of collecting is 100%. Everyone knows this value. The collection draw is independent of the victory draw.

Offer received: **61 ECU**

The lawyer receives a fee of 10 ECU, whether the settlement is accepted or the case goes to trial.

Only the client will see your advice. You cannot change the offer.

Your advice to the client

☐ Accept settlement ☐ Go to trial

Continue

Figure 1.11: Private lawyer advice with the offer and compensation rule.

Decide on the settlement

Your role: Client · Case 1 / 1

Probability of winning this case: **60%**

After a victory, the probability of collecting is 100%. Everyone knows this value. The collection draw is independent of the victory draw.

Offer received: **61 ECU**

Lawyer advice: **Go to trial**

The lawyer receives a fee of 10 ECU, whether the settlement is accepted or the case goes to trial.

You may follow the advice or choose the other option. Your decision determines the outcome.

Your final decision

☐ Accept settlement ☐ Go to trial

[Continue](#)

Figure 1.12: Client's final choice after receiving advice.

Please wait

The activity will continue when the members of your group finish this step. Keep this page open.

Figure 1.13: Neutral waiting while another role completes its step.

Case result

Your role: Client · Case 1 / 1

Outcome: **Settlement accepted**

Offer received: 61 ECU

Lawyer advice: Go to trial

The actual case probability is now disclosed: 60%

Your case balance

Endowment	100.0 ECU
Actual recovery	61.0 ECU
Trial cost	0.0 ECU
Fee paid	-10.0 ECU
Final balance	151.0 ECU

Continue

Figure 1.14: Client outcome and individual accounting.

Activity completed

All your decisions have been recorded. Wait for the instructor's directions. No further response is required.

Sum of your balances in ECU: **110.0**

Figure 1.15: Explicit completion and sum of recorded case balances.

Incentives, information and predictions

2.1 Reconstructing balances and expected trial outcomes

Begin the analysis by drawing the decision tree without attributing motives to participants. The defendant proposes an amount, the lawyer communicates advice and the client accepts or chooses trial. Settlement produces a certain transfer and avoids two costs of fifteen ECU. Trial replaces the offered transfer with a transfer of one hundred conditional on victory and collection. The treatment determines the fee and whether the client or an external fund pays it. Ask students to attach all three balances to every terminal branch and, where relevant, the fund's account. This is a useful discipline because a verbal description of success can conceal a fee or cost that changes its value.

Let s denote the offer, h the fee, w the indicator of victory and e the indicator of collection after victory. When the client finances the fee, settlement gives the client $100+s-h$, the lawyer $100+h$ and the defendant $100-s$. Trial gives the client $85+100we-h$, the lawyer $100+h$ and the defendant $85-100we$. The lawyer pays no additional private trial cost. This is an explicit simplification, not a claim that legal practice has no costs. Adding an unannounced private cost changes the problem and produces explanations inconsistent with the instructions participants received. Every classroom calculation should use the specified accounts before discussing how an actual institution might differ.

$$\begin{aligned}(\pi_C, \pi_A, \pi_D)_{\text{settlement}} &= (100 + s - h, 100 + h, 100 - s), \\ (\pi_C, \pi_A, \pi_D)_{\text{trial}} &= (85 + 100we - h, 100 + h, 85 - 100we).\end{aligned}$$

Settlement preserves a total balance of three hundred ECU because the offer and fee are internal transfers. Trial reduces the total to two hundred seventy, regardless of the winner. Each party loses fifteen to the procedure. Victory changes distribution but creates no additional resources inside the group. Under legal aid, the external fund contributes income to observed participant balances. To compare social accounting, subtract that subsidy from the group total. This prevents a higher internal total from being interpreted as improved efficiency when it simply reflects a transfer from an account outside the decision-making group. The exercise intentionally reports both the subsidy and the net total.

With a fixed fee of ten, a settlement of sixty gives balances of one hundred fifty, one hundred ten and forty. A victory with collection gives the client one hundred seventy-five, leaves the lawyer with one hundred ten and gives the defendant minus fifteen. Following a loss, the balances are seventy-five, one hundred ten and eighty-five. The lawyer's balance is identical across these outcomes. Consequently, a concern solely for the lawyer's monetary balance produces no strict preference between settlement and trial under the basic contract. Observed advice can instead

reflect social preferences, personal criteria, calculation errors or an intention to help the client. The payment rule alone does not select a unique message.

The probability of full recovery at trial is $q=p\gamma$. In the basic game p is 0.6 and γ is one, so q is also 0.6. The client's expected balance is eighty-five plus sixty minus ten, or one hundred thirty-five. Settlement gives ninety plus s . Equality occurs at an offer of forty-five. Above that amount, settlement gives a higher balance than the expected trial balance; below it, trial gives the higher expected balance. With integer offers, forty-five is the monetary indifference point, not an instruction to accept. Students should state whether they assume acceptance or rejection at an exact tie before proposing a unique minimum acceptable offer.

$$E[\pi_C \mid \text{trial}] = 85 + 100p\gamma - 10, \quad \pi_C \mid \text{settlement} = 90 + s, \quad s_C^* = 100p\gamma - 15.$$

The defendant can reconstruct their alternative as well. Basic trial gives an expected balance of eighty-five minus sixty, or twenty-five. Settlement gives one hundred minus s . The defendant would therefore prefer settlement at up to seventy-five if certain that the client would accept. Between forty-five and seventy-five, both parties can improve their expected balances relative to trial under risk neutrality. The interval has width thirty, equal to avoided total trial costs. The application does not fix the division of this surplus or guarantee an agreement in the interval. The defendant must anticipate acceptance, and the client evaluates the offer after receiving advice. This strategic sequence matters for interpreting the realized distribution.

Checkpoint

Check three accounts: settlement at 45 with a fixed fee, trial loss and trial victory without collection. Neither trial outcome transfers the claim when collection fails, but both retain the two costs of 15. The offer is never paid in addition to the judgment. State which role pays each amount.

2.2 Strategic offers, risk and the benchmark's limits

If the defendant knows that a risk-neutral client accepts every offer strictly above forty-five, they can try the smallest integer that assures acceptance. Forty-six suffices under strict acceptance; forty-five may suffice when the client accepts at indifference. This detail prevents claiming a unique offer without specifying tie-breaking. The argument also requires the defendant to know the client's behavior and advice not to alter the client's evaluation. A classroom generally does not satisfy those conditions with certainty. Use the prediction as a reference for asking why offers differ, rather than as a rule for assigning a mistake to everyone who offered another amount.

An offer above the theoretical minimum does not demonstrate an error. It may reflect uncertainty about acceptance, concern for distribution, aversion to conflict or an attempt to secure agreement. Likewise, a rejected low offer does not identify a particular preference. The defendant may have miscalculated, learned from earlier cases or anticipated a different acceptance probability. Ask what additional data would distinguish these explanations. A single offer and outcome cannot identify an entire belief system. Advice and the client's choice provide more evidence but do not remove the need for assumptions. Students can learn to distinguish an account consistent with the data from a mechanism uniquely demonstrated by them.

Risk neutrality permits a direct comparison of expected balances. A client who values certainty may accept less than forty-five while calculating trial's monetary expectation correctly. Someone who values the possibility of recovering the full claim may reject an offer above that threshold. Neither choice should automatically be labeled irrational. A risk-based explanation needs to specify

how uncertain outcomes are valued and show the resulting comparison. The activity does not independently elicit risk preferences. An instructor can therefore discuss this possibility without treating it as an identified psychological result. This distinction is particularly useful when the realized trial outcome tempts students to evaluate the earlier choice solely by whether it happened to succeed.

Repetition changes interpretation as well. A fixed group shares ten cases and may learn how its members respond. Fresh endowments and draws do not prevent beliefs about other people from depending on the past. Under reassignment, each person retains their role while partners change. This reduces continuity within the same group but preserves general learning. Comparing the modes prompts a discussion about what knowledge persists and what is lost. It does not isolate all reputation effects, because there is no public reputation profile and people may recognize classmates. The game should be described by its implemented information rather than by a stronger claim that reassignment erases all history.

The accumulated total includes a renewed endowment in every case. Someone participating ten times begins each time with one hundred and sums ten final balances. They do not carry a budget that limits the next offer. A negative defendant balance in one case does not prevent participation in the next. This rule keeps choices comparable and avoids introducing an unplanned liquidity constraint. Compare per-case averages when contrasting horizons. Directly comparing a ten-case sum with a one-case sum confounds the number of opportunities with the economic behavior of interest. Students should understand this accounting convention before interpreting the final screen as evidence of relative performance.

2.3 Professional information and decision authority

With private quality, the lawyer knows whether the victory probability is thirty or ninety percent. The client and defendant know the equal-probability distribution and begin with a mean probability of sixty percent before advice. The lawyer possesses information that could improve the client's choice, but the permitted message says only settlement or trial. It neither transmits a verifiable numerical report nor changes the fixed fee. The treatment can reveal whether advice is informative on average. Compare advice with recorded quality to investigate that question, rather than inferring quality from the random realized outcome. Even a high-probability case can lose, and a low-probability case can win.

Direct quality preserves the same distribution while also disclosing the actual probability to the client. The defendant remains uninformed. The comparison separates the client's access to information from a change in the probabilistic environment. An informed client's threshold is fifteen for low quality and seventy-five for high quality. An offer of sixty improves on expected trial in the low case but falls below expected trial in the high case under the monetary benchmark. Direct access allows the client to check this themselves. Advice remains available, allowing instructors to ask whether it is used differently when it is no longer the client's only case-specific signal.

Advice may contain useful information without disclosing the exact probability. For a given offer, settlement versus trial summarizes a relevant comparison. But no message has a unique interpretation independently of preferences. The intention to help, the compensation rule and perceptions of the case may affect advice. Strategic communication concerns the relationship between information and the objectives of sender and receiver. This game uses a binary message and a small state space, so it does not reproduce a continuous information-transmission model. Its teaching contribution is to make visible what the client loses when relying on advice that cannot be independently checked before choosing, and what changes when the same number becomes directly available.

Delegation gives the lawyer final authority. The treatment retains a public probability, fixed fee and the basic case distribution. The lawyer's choice determines settlement or trial, and the client's second decision disappears. Because the lawyer's monetary balance does not change between options, self-interest alone predicts no strict direction for delegation's effect. If more trials are observed, that result cannot be attributed to a procedure-based fee absent from this treatment. The comparison addresses control and autonomy under a specific contract, preserving the difference between a behavioral change and its possible explanation. Students should resist importing incentives from another variant merely because both involve lawyers.

Attention

Trial advice is not evidence of dishonesty. First inspect the offer, probability, collection rule, contract and authority. Then state the assumptions under which the advice would conflict with the client's monetary interest. This session does not measure professional ethics or real legal quality and should not rank individual participants on those dimensions.

2.4 Evidence and relationship to the literature

Sadka, Seira and Woodruff study information and bargaining through agents in Mexican labor courts. Their field experiment finds that personalized information can change settlement when it reaches the worker. This motivates separating client access from lawyer advice. This game is an original teaching mechanism: its probabilities, costs and fees are announced parameters, without actual files or estimated case predictions. It neither replicates the study nor transports its empirical magnitude into the classroom. The published reference is from 2024, with earlier working-paper versions. Instructors should distinguish the inspiration for a mechanism from the numerical calibration used to teach it.

Holmström provides a framework for considering information and contracts in agency relationships. That moral-hazard model should not be confused with this activity, which has no hidden effort. Crawford and Sobel provide a reference on communication from a better-informed sender to a receiver who chooses. The connection is conceptual because this game uses two messages and its own payoffs. These references help formulate questions and identify simplifications; none is presented as the exact source of the game's figures. Verified bibliographic routes appear at the end so instructors can assign the original works and ask students to compare their structures with the classroom decision tree.

External-validity discussion can begin with absent features: lawyer selection, negotiated compensation, litigation duration, liquidity needs, procedural liabilities, professional obligations and heterogeneous claims. Such features matter in actual disputes but should not be informally added to classroom decisions. The design controls several dimensions to make a transparent comparison possible. After establishing that intuition, ask what change would be required to study an omitted feature. This turns a laboratory limitation into a design task without claiming results about an institution the activity has not represented. Students can specify a new branch and its data requirements while keeping the delivered family's existing rules intact.

Extensions and their comparisons

3.1 Procedure-based fees

The first treatment changes only compensation: ten ECU following settlement and twenty-five following trial. Probability, costs, information and authority remain as in the basic game. The lawyer earns fifteen more when trial occurs and incurs no additional private cost. Concern solely for the lawyer's balance therefore produces a strict preference for trial regardless of the offer. The client incorporates the increased fee in the trial alternative. Their expected trial balance falls to one hundred twenty, while settlement gives ninety plus s. The acceptance threshold falls to thirty. An offer of forty might thus be rejected in the basic game and accepted under this contract according to the risk-neutral reference.

The change contains two related mechanisms: it modifies the lawyer's incentive and the client's monetary alternative. Show both before attributing a settlement difference exclusively to professional persuasion. The client knows the regime and can anticipate its consequence even when ignoring advice. The defendant also knows the contract and may change the offer. In a comparison of complete sessions, offers form part of the observed institutional effect. An interpretation holding offers constant requires conditional comparisons or a separate exercise with externally fixed offers. The delivered variant retains the defendant's actual decision. This makes it possible to discuss both strategic adjustment and the difficulty of interpreting a conditional outcome.

Read offers and fees first, then advice and final choices. More trial recommendations are consistent with the induced incentive but do not identify how much arises from self-interest, learning or misunderstanding. Disagreement shows that the client retains control. Trial advice followed by settlement does not prove that advice had no effect: the client might have acted differently without it. That counterfactual is not observed for the same person in the same case. The activity teaches students to recognize this limit before asserting an individual causal effect. It also lets them distinguish a recommendation's content from the outcome chosen by someone with final authority.

Feedback script

Calculate the same offer of 40 under fixed and procedure-based fees. Ask why the client's acceptance threshold falls even though the lawyer receives more at trial. Distinguish the change in the client's outside option from the incentive faced by the representative. Require all three accounts before interpreting a recommendation.

3.2 Recovery-based fees

Commission is twenty percent of the amount actually collected. Under settlement s , the fee is $0.2s$. Following victory and collection it is twenty; following loss or victory without collection it is zero. The client retains eighty percent of recovery and pays fifteen at trial. Settlement gives one hundred plus $0.8s$; basic trial gives an expected balance of eighty-five plus forty-eight, or one hundred thirty-three. Indifference occurs at 41.25. Integer offer forty-two exceeds the threshold and forty-one falls below it. The report displays the continuous reference so the instructor can explain how permissible offers interact with a noninteger monetary benchmark.

Commission makes the lawyer's income depend on recovery, but does not completely align preferences. The lawyer compares $0.2s$ with an expected trial fee of twelve. Their indifference threshold is sixty, above the client's threshold. Between integer offers 42 and 59, a risk-neutral client prefers settlement while a lawyer concerned only with their own balance prefers trial advice. The reason is that the client pays the procedural cost and the lawyer does not. This concrete divergence is more instructive than claiming that outcome-based pay always aligns incentives. The analysis must identify every account term, rather than relying on the presence of a commission to establish common interests.

With offer 61, the fee is 12.2 ECU and balances are 148.8 for the client, 112.2 for the lawyer and 39 for the defendant. The implementation preserves integer subunits of 0.2 ECU rather than rounding the fee to twelve or thirteen. Balances display one decimal place. Exported calculations use ECU; internal fifths support integrity checks. Before interpreting small differences, check this precision. A classroom calculation using a rounded fee may create an apparent discrepancy originating in the manual account rather than the recorded choices. Students can use this example to understand that a payment definition includes its measurement scale as well as its economic formula.

3.3 Private quality and direct client access

These treatments use equally likely low- and high-quality cases. In both, the lawyer knows the actual probability and the defendant knows only the distribution. The first hides the value from the client; the second displays it before the offer. Neither changes fixed compensation or final authority. The contrast asks a precise question: what happens when the client receives the same number as their representative? It does not improve the court or raise mean winning probability. Both distributions average sixty percent. Expected behavioral differences concern how choices depend on each case's quality, rather than an unconditional improvement in the chance of success.

Low-quality trial gives the client an expected balance of one hundred five, while settlement gives ninety plus s . Offers above fifteen improve on that expectation. High-quality trial gives one hundred sixty-five, requiring an offer of seventy-five to match it. Before advice, the uninformed client's threshold is forty-five under the announced distribution. Advice may change their belief if regarded as informative. The application does not elicit that belief or estimate trust in the lawyer. The report relates choices to actual quality for discussion, without presenting this as a psychological measurement. State which information the participant had when comparing their choice with an informed benchmark.

With offer 60, advice serving the client's expected balance would recommend settlement for low quality and trial for high quality. But a fixed fee leaves the lawyer monetarily indifferent. This reference assumes that the lawyer uses information for the client's benefit; it does not follow solely from the lawyer's self-interest. Asking students to state this assumption exposes a social preference hidden within an apparently simple prediction. If advice does not change with quality, it may contain little information, but that observation alone does not establish an intention to harm. Probability comprehension and attention to the offer remain possible explanations. The instructor

Send your advice

Your role: Lawyer · Case 1 / 10

Probability of winning this case: **60%**

After a victory, the probability of collecting is 100%. Everyone knows this value. The collection draw is independent of the victory draw.

Offer received: **61 ECU**

The lawyer receives 20% of the amount actually recovered: the settlement or the 100 ECU collected following trial. With no recovery, the fee is zero. Tenths of an ECU are recorded.

Only the client will see your advice. You cannot change the offer.


Your advice to the client

☐ Accept settlement ☐ Go to trial

Continue


Figure 3.1: Lawyer advice under recovery-based compensation.

can ask what additional evidence would distinguish them.



The screenshot shows a web interface titled "Case information". Below the title is a blue bar with the text "Your role: Client · Case 1 / 10". A light blue box contains two paragraphs: "You do not observe this case probability. It is 30% or 90%, each equally likely." and "After a victory, the probability of collecting is 100%. Everyone knows this value. The collection draw is independent of the victory draw." Below this box, it says "Advice is nonbinding: the client makes the final decision." At the bottom is a blue button labeled "Continue".

Figure 3.2: Client who observes the distribution but not actual case probability.



The screenshot shows a web interface titled "Case information". Below the title is a green bar with the text "Your role: Lawyer · Case 1 / 10". A light blue box contains two paragraphs: "Probability of winning this case: **30%**" and "After a victory, the probability of collecting is 100%. Everyone knows this value. The collection draw is independent of the victory draw." Below this box, it says "Advice is nonbinding: the client makes the final decision." At the bottom is a blue button labeled "Continue".

Figure 3.3: Lawyer who privately observes actual probability.

Conditional comparisons are particularly useful. Under low quality, more acceptance of moderate offers may reflect using information; under high quality, less acceptance of the same offers may reflect using information too. The overall settlement rate can conceal these opposite responses. Equal randomization probabilities do not guarantee equal counts of high-quality cases in small sessions. Inspect sample size by quality and avoid treating percentages based on a few cases as precise estimates. Winning draws also do not guarantee that high-quality groups always win or low-quality groups always lose. These observations help students distinguish the announced distribution, the realized case composition and the realized trial outcomes.

Case information

Your role: Client · Case 1 / 10

Probability of winning this case: **30%**

After a victory, the probability of collecting is 100%. Everyone knows this value. The collection draw is independent of the victory draw.

Advice is nonbinding: the client makes the final decision.

Continue

Figure 3.4: Client with direct access to the same probability as the lawyer.

3.4 Binding delegation

Under delegation, the lawyer's page requests a binding choice, rather than advice that the client can ignore. The client decision is omitted and the group waits for results. Instructions, comprehension and the decision title all make this change visible. Language matters: calling a binding choice a recommendation would misrepresent the client's remaining control. The defendant still does not see the private message, though they necessarily observe settlement or trial. There is no additional client ratification after the lawyer decides. Ask students to locate the changed node in the tree and identify exactly which response field disappears from the data.

The fee remains fixed and the probability public. Delegation therefore does not itself generate a strict monetary preference for the lawyer. Different valuations, personal norms or understanding may change settlement, but the game does not separately identify those motives. Client-lawyer disagreement is undefined here because there is no final client choice to compare. The report displays a dash with denominator zero for that metric. Recording every delegated choice as agreement would manufacture a perfect concordance rate and confuse missing-by-design observations with obedience. This is a useful example for teaching data interpretation: an omitted decision is not a decision to follow advice, even when the resulting outcome is visible.

For discussion, students may design a different comparison: delegation with procedure-based fees. That hypothetical combines authority with an explicit monetary preference for trial. It is not among the seven delivered treatments and should not be presented as a configuration already executed. It is a reasoning exercise about an interaction between rules. Producing it later would require a specified hypothesis, validated instructions and accounts, and a documented comparison. Keeping that distinction prevents a classroom discussion from becoming an inaccurate promise of functionality. It also reminds students that adding a treatment should be justified by a learning question rather than by the ease of combining parameters.

Choose the case outcome

Your role: Lawyer · Case 1 / 10

Probability of winning this case: **60%**

After a victory, the probability of collecting is 100%. Everyone knows this value. The collection draw is independent of the victory draw.

Offer received: **61 ECU**

The lawyer receives a fee of 10 ECU, whether the settlement is accepted or the case goes to trial.

This choice determines the outcome. The client will see your decision, and the defendant will see only the final outcome.

Your binding decision

☐ Accept settlement ☐ Go to trial

Continue

Figure 3.5: Binding lawyer choice; the client does not submit a second decision.

3.5 Legal aid and uncertain enforcement

Legal aid retains the fixed fee of ten while transferring its payment to an external fund. The lawyer receives the same income and the client keeps ten additional ECU under both settlement and trial. The client's threshold therefore stays at forty-five. A higher balance does not necessarily change the marginal comparison between accepting and litigating. The report records the subsidy per case and subtracts it from the group total to obtain the net social balance. The treatment asks who finances representation and how a transfer is reported, without assuming that financing changes quality, effort or victory probability. None of those additional mechanisms is introduced by the current rule.

Results explicitly show the fund's payment. Under settlement 60, the client, lawyer and defendant obtain 160,110 and 40. Their total is 310, but the fund paid ten, leaving a social net of 300. Following trial, the internal sum is 280 and the net 270. These accounts distinguish the client's observed welfare from a total that includes the financier. Taxes, budget constraints and eligibility criteria are absent from the model. Instructors may discuss them as further institutional questions without adding them retrospectively to the rules under which choices were made. The subsidy is an accounting observation in this exercise, rather than evidence that assistance improves professional service quality.

Case result

Your role: Client · Case 1 / 10

Outcome: **Settlement accepted**

Offer received: 61 ECU

Lawyer advice: Go to trial

The actual case probability is now disclosed: 60%

Your case balance

Endowment	100.0 ECU
Actual recovery	61.0 ECU
Trial cost	0.0 ECU
Fee paid	0.0 ECU
Final balance	161.0 ECU

Fee paid by the fund: 10.0 ECU

Continue

Figure 3.6: Externally financed fee and explicit subsidy in the client result.

Uncertain enforcement sets collection probability after victory at fifty percent, known to everyone.

Victory remains sixty percent, so full recovery occurs with thirty percent probability. Under the fixed fee, winning without collection gives the client the same monetary balance as losing: no claim transfer occurs and costs remain payable. The settlement threshold falls to fifteen. The defendant pays one hundred only when enforcement succeeds, rather than whenever the victory draw favors the client. Separating the events avoids recording a payment on an uncollected judgment. Students should calculate the joint probability before discussing expected recovery, and should identify which branch produces no transfer despite a favorable judgment.

The report displays victories over trials and collections over victories. Both denominators matter. A session without trials cannot estimate a victory rate, and one without victories cannot estimate collection probability. A dash means no observations, not a zero probability. In a small class, observed collection may differ substantially from the announced fifty percent. The draw is not designed to produce exactly half successful collections in every session. Verifying the probabilistic rule requires implementation checks and many draws; classroom learning instead focuses on reconstructing the tree and recognizing sampling variation. Avoid describing a run of failed collections as evidence that the configured probability changed.

These treatments cover the plan's six proposed dimensions plus the direct-access control. Hidden effort, professional selection and reputation are not added because they require different mechanisms and learning questions. Production efficiency comes from shared mathematics, common screens and a common data structure while retaining evidence for each changed behavior. A class need not execute all seven treatments at once. Instructors can choose two related to an objective and use the full guide to prepare later comparisons. Complete coverage in the package does not require an overloaded learning session. The useful unit for teaching remains a transparent contrast that students can explain through accounts, information and authority.

Case result

Your role: Client · Case 1 / 10

Outcome: **Trial**

Offer received: 61 ECU

Lawyer advice: Go to trial

The actual case probability is now disclosed: 60%

Victory: Yes

Collection following victory: Yes

Your case balance

Endowment	100.0 ECU
Actual recovery	100.0 ECU
Trial cost	-15.0 ECU
Fee paid	-10.0 ECU
Final balance	175.0 ECU

[Continue](#)

Figure 3.7: Trial victory and collection displayed as separate events.

Teaching with the session's results

4.1 Revealing and reading the report

The instructor report begins with progress. It displays completed cases, pending opportunities and participant count while aggregates remain hidden. The instructor chooses when to reveal results and can hide them again. This control allows groups to finish before behavior is projected. The application retains data for authorized administration, but the discussion view exposes neither participant codes nor individual advice. Prepare projection in a window separate from participant links. Opening the report neither sends a message to students nor changes their choices. This distinction helps keep administrative navigation separate from the participant sequence, especially when the same instructor is operating both a demonstration and a classroom session.




Figure 4.1: Report before any cases are complete, with aggregates hidden.




Figure 4.2: Actual progress with completed cases and pending opportunities.

A complete case requires an offer, advice or a binding lawyer choice, the applicable final decision and outcome accounting. Two groups over ten cases create twenty opportunities even when only two have finished. The progress denominator is twenty, whereas metrics use the two complete cases. Remaining opportunities are not rejections, zero offers or lost trials. If someone leaves, their group remains pending and the report does not fabricate a response. During an interim discussion, explain that available aggregates are partial and that early finishers may differ from continuing

participants. The report's completion rule supports transparent interpretation, but does not make the observed partial sample representative of all enrolled students.

Mean and median offers describe amounts proposed before the final decision. Settlement rate describes realized choices. Trial-advice rate describes the lawyer's message when the client has authority; under delegation it describes a binding choice and must be interpreted accordingly. Disagreement compares advice with the client's final choice. A disagreement does not establish that the client corrected harmful advice: that requires calculating which option improved their expected balance. Likewise, agreement does not prove appropriate advice. Both parties can select the same option for a reason inconsistent with the instructor's benchmark. The report provides descriptive measures; explanations require additional reasoning about rules, information and preferences.




Figure 4.3: Revealed aggregate metrics with explicit denominators.

Your role	Final balance	n
Client	151.0 ECU	2
Lawyer	110.0 ECU	2
Defendant	39.0 ECU	2

Figure 4.4: Mean role balances using consistent role colors.

Read role balances alongside fees, recovery and costs. Greater gross recovery may accompany a smaller client balance when trial and additional fees are necessary. A lawyer can earn more while the client receives less, particularly under procedure-based compensation. The defendant may favor settlement that transfers resources but avoids cost and risk. For distribution, compare each role's balance with its renewed endowment. For accounting efficiency, inspect the group total net of subsidy. These questions differ and should not be answered from one report column. A useful discussion can ask students to find an outcome that improves one role's account without improving the net total, and to explain the transfer responsible.

The histogram has five offer intervals: 0–19, 20–39, 40–59, 60–79 and 80–100. Each row displays a count, percentage and bar on a common scale. Counts sum to complete cases. The intervals compare distributions without projecting individual offers, but group forty-five with amounts above

and below the threshold. A histogram alone cannot establish benchmark-consistent acceptance. The conditional table separates actual quality and two broad offer bands to guide questions. A more precise analysis can reconstruct treatment-specific thresholds from export and define appropriate intervals. Students should recognize that a visualization's categories determine what comparison is visible and what information requires a separate calculation.

Offer interval	n	%
0–19	0	0.0%
20–39	0	0.0%
40–59	0	0.0%
60–79	2	100.0%
80–100	0	0.0%

Figure 4.5: Offer distribution with counts and percentages.

Case	n	Mean offer	Settlement rate	Mean fee
1	2	61.0	100.0%	10.0

Figure 4.6: Case evolution; unfinished opportunities retain missing results.

Case evolution shows observations, mean offers, settlement rates and mean fees. A trend may reflect learning, case composition, one group's behavior or chance. Under private and direct quality, random case composition can differ across periods within one session. Before interpreting more litigation as learning, check whether that period contains more high-quality cases. Fixed roles also generate repeated observations from the same people. Aggregates support immediate feedback; statistical evaluation must address dependence and treatment-assignment units. The table should prompt a question about a possible trend rather than convert every sequence of percentages into evidence of a stable behavioral law.

The report includes monetary thresholds calculated from the rules. Under private quality, quality-conditional thresholds describe an informed client, whereas the pre-advice reference uses the mean sixty percent probability. Present both perspectives explicitly. A table containing actual quality does not imply that the client knew it when choosing. Direct-quality participants do receive that value. This separation between analyst information and participant information is central: retrospectively evaluating a decision with unavailable information may produce an unjustified judgment about rationality. Ask students to redraw the information set at the decision node before comparing observed behavior with a threshold calculated from the complete exported record.

4.2 Class plan and discussion script

A sixty-minute class can allow ten minutes for access and rules, twenty for choices, twenty for feedback and ten for an individual exercise. Actual duration depends on case count, familiarity with oTree and connectivity. The summary's durations are operational estimates awaiting a classroom pilot, not measured times. Ten cases or a treatment comparison may require eighty minutes or two classes. Select the learning objective first and the horizon second: more completed cases do not automatically produce more learning. Instructors should also allow time for students to reconstruct a payment tree, since understanding the sequence often matters more than maximizing the number of decisions submitted.

Before revealing aggregates, ask each student to write the basic acceptance threshold and the three balances following offer 60. Independent answers prevent the discussion from beginning only with projected percentages. Then ask for two predictions about a variant and the equation supporting each. Reveal results to compare predictions with observed data while attending to sample sizes. Finally, change an offer or probability to test whether students can transfer the method. This sequence connects decisions, theory and assessment without requiring participants to explain their own behavior publicly. It makes clear that feedback concerns the mechanism and its implications, rather than a ranking of classmates by financial success.

Start feedback from settlement: what did each role receive, and which payment was a transfer? Next reconstruct trial: which costs remain even after a loss? Introduce the representative: what changes in the lawyer's account when trial is chosen? Then discuss information: which number could the client use before deciding? This order keeps explanation close to the accounts and delays discussion of motives until constraints are clear. It prevents a label such as conflict of interest from substituting for the calculation needed to justify it. If students disagree, ask them to identify the exact term or information assumption on which their answers depend.

What participants will see

Follow-up task: with a 20% commission, offer 50 and victory probability 60%, calculate the client's certain settlement balance and expected trial balance. Calculate both lawyer fees as well. Explain why the two roles may prefer different outcomes even when professional payment depends on recovery. State the risk-neutrality assumption used in the comparison.

The answer gives the client one hundred forty with settlement and one hundred thirty-three in expected trial balance. The lawyer receives ten under settlement and twelve in expected trial fees. A risk-neutral client prefers settlement, while a self-interested lawyer prefers trial. This checks whether students subtract the procedural cost from the correct role and apply commission to the appropriate recovery. Multiplying the endowment by twenty percent confuses remuneration with initial wealth. Subtracting fifteen from the lawyer introduces an unannounced cost. Feedback should identify the mistaken account term rather than simply marking the final preferred outcome as right or wrong, since the reasoning is the learning target.

A second exercise can use legal aid. Ask what happens to client and lawyer balances, the acceptance threshold and the net social total. A complete answer states that the client gains ten in both options, the lawyer receives the same fee, the threshold is unchanged and the subsidy must be subtracted from the internal sum. A third problem can present victory without collection. The student retains trial costs and the fixed fee, removes the hundred-unit transfer and distinguishes this branch from enforced victory. These short tasks test different mechanisms without repeating a whole session. They also let the instructor assess learning when the classroom's realized data contain few trials or no failed collections.

Feedback script

After showing aggregates, ask which prediction follows from payments alone and which requires a lawyer who wishes to help. What number received directly by the client would change the choice? Which comparison distinguishes information from authority? Require a tree and an account before accepting a verbal explanation, and allow several interpretations when the data do not identify a unique motive.

For advanced students, the task can be to propose an analysis strategy. They specify assignment unit, primary outcome, treatment contrast, treatment of incomplete opportunities and inference criterion. They explain why overall settlement may conceal different responses by quality. They also examine offer endogeneity: the defendant knows the regime and can change the amount. Analysis

conditional on realized offers need not identify the same effect as comparison with externally fixed offers. The activity supports that distinction without promising causal estimation from a small class. Students can outline which variables the existing export supplies and which additional design choices would be required for a stronger empirical claim.

A rubric can give equal weight to accounting, information, authority and interpretation. A complete answer calculates balances, distinguishes private from public information, locates the binding decision and limits claims to available evidence. A partially correct answer may compute the trial expectation but omit fees, or recognize a conflict without identifying its origin. Return specific comments on these components. Grading only settlement versus trial would turn an analytical activity into an evaluation of preferences and overlook its intended understanding. Students who made different choices can still demonstrate equally strong reasoning when they accurately state their assumptions and the relevant constraints.

4.3 Data, operation and package completion

Custom export contains session, case, group, role, treatment, probability, enforcement, authority, offer, advice, client choice, final outcome, victory, collection, fee, subsidy, recovery, balance and completion status. Group identifies a three-person interaction within a period; with reassignment it does not identify a permanent relationship among people. Each row corresponds to a role in a case, so group variables appear three times. Counting cases requires one observation per session, period and group. Summing fees or subsidies across all three rows would duplicate the case account without recognizing this structure. Before analysis, students should state which columns describe individuals and which describe the common interaction.

Client choice is absent under delegation and in other roles' rows. Advice and offers are absent when a pending case has not reached those steps. Retain these as missing values rather than converting them to zero. Interpret victory after checking that trial occurred; interpret collection after checking victory. A zero victory indicator under settlement is not a judicial defeat. Likewise, the initial balance field of a pending row should not enter an average of outcomes. Completion provides a transparent inclusion rule. These distinctions teach that a numeric field requires the event context that makes its value meaningful, particularly when the same schema represents several treatment sequences.

Export access belongs to authorized staff. The projected report contains aggregates and excludes participant identifiers. If the activity is used for research, the responsible investigator must establish protocol and conditions before beginning; this teaching package claims no research approvals and does not constitute research consent. For ordinary teaching, explain what the exercise records and avoid requesting names or unnecessary demographic characteristics. The application includes no such forms. Pedagogical questions can be discussed with aggregate cases without reconstructing who made each choice. Instructors should also avoid displaying the raw administrative export while describing the report as anonymous, because those interfaces serve different purposes.

When a group remains waiting, staff should check whether another member is still on a decision page. They can inspect access and connectivity without requesting disclosure of the answer. Repeated refreshing or reinitializing the database is not an appropriate remedy for waiting. The instance uses a family-specific database and preserves existing sessions. The generic runner starts representation with an explicit port; preparation uses 8082. Validation runs against a separate test database. Keeping these environments distinct allows testing without changing a real activity's choices. If the process must restart after a software correction, preserve the database and confirm the session rather than treating the restart as authorization to erase records.

For a language issue, first check the selected configuration. Spanish and English rooms use different

prefixes, and language is chosen when creating the session. An unexpected binding-choice page may mean delegation was selected. A fee of 12.2 following offer 61 is valid commission accounting. A missing collection rate may mean there were no victories. These checks connect each symptom with a concrete rule, instead of solving by intuition what requires reading the active treatment. For an actual technical error, retain the session and record the exact step before requesting support. The instructor can then distinguish a configuration mistake, a comprehension problem and an application defect.

Checkpoint

Completion checklist: verify twenty configurations, four rooms, correct language and a participant count divisible by three. Check roles, authority, decimal precision and explicit closure. Before projection inspect completion and denominators; before analysis remove duplication of group variables. Preserve the database and participant links, and record the environment used for the class.

The package includes design and coverage matrices, rapid accounting checks, representative bots for the ten Spanish branches and real browser walkthroughs in both languages. Modes sharing mathematics do not duplicate calculations merely because wording changes. Screenshots cover access, common flow, exclusive information, authority, financing, enforcement and report states. Git stores one shared figures folder, while Dropbox receives self-contained language folders. Publication requires the appropriate authorized step. A local commit and a proposed public route do not imply that students can already access this game publicly. The handoff should therefore include the verified local entry and the current publication status as separate facts.

The package supports class preparation and a pilot. A pilot should record timing, comprehension difficulties and connection problems without presenting them beforehand as observed outcomes. If a rule proves unclear, revise its wording, inspect the affected screen and recompile the relevant guide pages. A payment change also requires account checks and the corresponding branch test. This criterion keeps production efficient while preserving quality: evidence is renewed where behavior changes and stable material is reused. Editorial and operational choices remain subordinate to the legal-representation learning question. The instructor can use feedback from one pilot to improve clarity while retaining the comparability of the existing treatment mechanisms.

Bibliography

- Sadka, J., Seira, E. and Woodruff, C. (2024). Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico's Labour Courts. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 91(6), 3677–3711. <https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/91/6/3677/7596323>. Working-paper version: <https://doi.org/10.3386/w25137>.
- Holmström, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. *The Bell Journal of Economics*, 10(1), 74–91. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320>.
- Crawford, V. P. and Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic Information Transmission. *Econometrica*, 50(6), 1431–1451. Text: <https://www.haverford.edu/sites/default/files/CrawfordSobel1982.pdf>.
- American Economic Association. JEL classification consulted for K41, D82, D86, C92 and A22. <https://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/jelCodes.php?view=jel>.