



Instructor's Guide to Interest Groups

Laboratory implementation, theoretical foundations,
experimental evidence, and variants

Behavioral and Experimental Economics Research Lab
Department of Economics



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<https://beer-lab.org/>

How to use this guide

This guide supports the preparation, implementation, and classroom discussion of the interest-group, mobilization, and electoral-information family available through the Behavioral and Experimental Economics Research Lab (BEER Lab) at the Department of Economics of Tecnológico de Monterrey. It is intended for instructors with different levels of familiarity with experimental and behavioral economics.

The document offers three reading paths. The **opening chapter** supports session preparation. The operational chapters explain each screen used by instructors and students. The conceptual chapters present the theories, predictions, and empirical findings needed to lead the post-game discussion.

Access instructions and common screens are explained once. Each variant then focuses only on what changes relative to the basic game: configuration, group size, decisions, predictions, relevant outcomes, and academic literature.

Author

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For the instructor

This guide follows the English-language interface. Spanish configurations use the same logic. Never project individual codes or connect outcomes to names, student identification numbers, or seats in the room.

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Preparation and purpose

Purpose	Study verifiable information for policy and electorate selection
Participants	Groups of 3; two interest groups require 4; reassignment minimum 6
Suggested duration	30–45 minutes one encounter; 60–90 repeated play and discussion
Experimental unit	Group per encounter; automated citizen units in mobilization
Basic edition	Conditional information: one encounter, ten fixed, ten reassigned
Extended edition	23 treatments per language; 52 configurations and 4 rooms overall
Decision	Offer, commitment and ballot; or mobilized set and platforms
Payoff	100 ECU initial account. Information: prize 60, benefit 60, certificate 10, policy loss 30, qualities -40/40. Mobilization: distance loss 0.5 per point, prize 60
Topics	Interest groups; electoral mobilization; verifiable information; policy concessions; candidate selection; electorate composition
JEL	A22, C92, D72, D82
Proposed access; publication pending: https://interestgroups.beer-lab.org/room/interest_groups_en	

1.1 Two forms of electoral influence

For the instructor

This family examines how an organized actor changes an election without directly purchasing a citizen's ballot. It contains two distinct modules. In information, the group knows a candidate's quality and may certify it in exchange for a policy favoring its interests. In mobilization, the group chooses which additional citizens participate, changing the electorate to which two candidates respond. The activity asks who benefits from intervention and why better information or greater participation does not by itself establish a welfare improvement for everyone.

The basic edition uses information exchange. Three people represent a group, one candidate, and one voter. The electoral alternative has known quality and requires no additional participant. Mobilization extensions also use three people, but their roles are one group and two candidates. Citizens are automated units with public induced preferences. A two-group extension needs four people. Do not pool payments or analysis units across the modules. They share a question about organized influence but are neither one mechanism nor a mandatory sequence in which information is played before mobilization. Select the module and institutional contrast before opening the

session.

1.2 Objectives and curricular placement

Students should finish able to reconstruct who knows quality, what the voter observes, and when a concession becomes binding. They should calculate accounts for all three roles, distinguish an offer from an issued certificate, and separate quality selection from policy preferences. In mobilization they should distinguish the potential population, active electorate, mobilized set, and chosen platforms. They should also explain why activation does not alter citizens' preferred positions.

The family suits political economy, information economics, and game theory. It requires simple probabilities, expected values, and distances on a line. Catalog topics are interest groups, electoral mobilization, verifiable information, policy concessions, candidate selection, and electorate composition. JEL codes are A22, C92, D72, and D82. It complements electoral discipline, clientelism, and citizen-candidate entry already available in the laboratory. Here participants do not decide who pays candidacy costs, promise a transfer to voters, or receive an exogenously reduced individual voting cost. An organized actor chooses an intervention and anticipates the electoral responses it may create. Locating that decision precisely is more useful than treating every activity involving political influence as the same game.

1.3 Participants, encounters, and matching

The basic edition offers one encounter, ten with fixed groups, and ten with reassigned groups. Each information group contains three people, with one participant per role. Reassignment requires at least six people in multiples of three. It preserves individual roles while changing group composition across encounters; it does not guarantee that two people never meet again. Candidate quality is drawn anew and independently in every encounter.

Extensions use ten fixed encounters. Ordinary mobilization requires multiples of three, while two-group mobilization requires multiples of four. Eleven automated citizens do not increase the number of humans who must connect. Their votes cannot be interpreted as eleven observed student decisions. As a planning estimate, allow thirty to forty-five minutes for one explained encounter and discussion, and sixty to ninety minutes for repeated play or a treatment comparison. The economic unit is a group during one encounter. Repetitions within a fixed group share people and experience and are not independent observations from new populations. Report the matching rule alongside any apparent treatment difference so that the class understands what has actually been compared.

1.4 Access, languages, and edition

Start at beer-lab.org and select CLASSROOM; Spanish navigation uses CLASE. This opens teaching.beer-lab.org, where title, topic, and JEL filters help locate the activity. Search interest groups or grupos de interés and confirm the card's language and edition. Catalog language does not by itself determine session language.

The proposed host is interestgroups.beer-lab.org. Until publication, use the local preview accompanying delivery. Shared institutional-navigation images do not establish that this new family is published. Localhost works on the computer running the server and is not a public link for remote students. Before class, verify the actual access path your group will use without replaying

previously approved account tests. This operational access check is distinct from validation of the underlying economic rules.




Figure 1.1: Shared institutional navigation; new publication pending

1.5 Demo and four isolated rooms

Demo contains fifty-two configurations from this family: three basic and twenty-three extended per language. Rooms contains `grupos_interes_es`, `interest_groups_en`, `grupos_interes_extendido`, and `interest_groups_extended`. Basic rooms offer only their three modes. Extended rooms contain the language's information and mobilization treatments.

Before creating a session, confirm module, G's role, attendance, and treatment. Two-group sessions need four people; other conditions need three, except basic reassignment requiring at least six. Forms explain sizes, and the server checks them again. Do not convert an already-created information session into mobilization merely to reuse links: roles and timing change. Create the appropriate configuration and retain the name and code of the session to analyze. This avoids silently combining observations from economically different protocols.




Figure 1.2: Search by title, topic, or JEL before choosing language and edition




Figure 1.3: Four isolated rooms for this family

oTree Demo Sessions Rooms Data Server Check Logout

Room: [EN] Interest groups

Create a new session

Session Config

Interest groups - EN - One encounter

Number of participants

Complete groups of 3 participants. Use a multiple of 3; minimum 3.

Create

[Configure session](#) ⚙

App sequence

interest_group_game (10 rounds) Interest groups exchange verified information for policy or select a mobilized electorate.

0 participants present

Start links

These URLs will stay constant for new sessions, even if the database is recreated.

Room-wide URL

Here is the room-wide URL anyone can use. Don't use this link when testing in multiple tabs on the same browser, because all tabs will be assigned to the same participant, using a cookie.

http://127.0.0.1:8143/room/interest_groups_en

Figure 1.4: The basic room offers three modes in the correct language

Rules, accounts, and decisions

2.1 Roles, quality, and the known alternative

Information groups contain G, candidate C, and voter V. C has high quality 40 or low quality -40, with a reference high-quality probability of 75%. G and C know the realization; V knows the possible values and initial probability. An alternative has quality 0 and always implements option 0. It makes no decisions and is therefore represented automatically.

C can commit to option 0 or option 1 under the relevant communication rule. V chooses C or the alternative, determining who implements policy. This module has neither a multiple-voter majority nor an electoral lottery: one human voter decides. Quality is an induced characteristic entering V's account, rather than an assessment of the person assigned to C. G does not value quality directly and prefers implementation of option 1. C receives an election reward without a material policy preference. Separating these objectives identifies the incentives that can sustain a concession. It also prevents the class from treating every gain to the candidate as a gain to the voter or confusing the group's policy objective with concern for candidate competence.

2.2 Information-module accounts

What participants will see

Every person starts with 100 ECU, meaning experimental currency units. G adds 60 if option 1 is implemented and subtracts 10 for issuing a certificate. Certification costs apply even if the certified candidate loses. C adds 60 after election and keeps 100 after defeat. V adds the selected candidate's quality and subtracts 30 if option 1 is implemented. Choosing the alternative always gives V 100 because that alternative's quality and option are both zero.

If high-quality C is elected with option 1 after certification, accounts are 150 for G, 160 for C, and 110 for V. If V instead chooses the alternative after that certificate, G receives 90, C receives 100, and V receives 100. Electing low-quality C with option 1 gives V 30. These accounts show that certification does not guarantee victory and truthful information does not eliminate policy conflict. Initial accounts renew across encounters, and all active earnings are added. Accumulated balances do not fund later decisions, and the local session does not convert ECU into real money. Students should calculate the implemented outcome rather than assuming that a proposed policy necessarily takes effect.



Instructions

Resources and unit of account

Each person receives 100 ECU per encounter. ECU means experimental currency units. G receives the base plus 60 ECU if option 1 is implemented, minus 10 ECU if issuing a certificate, whether C wins or loses. C receives the base plus 60 ECU if elected. V receives the base plus the chosen candidate's quality, minus 30 ECU if option 1 is implemented. The alternative has quality 0 and option 0. In versions with an observer G, their account is the fixed base with no certification cost.

Initial accounts are renewed each encounter. Earnings are added across all active encounters; no single round is selected for payment. Accumulated balances do not finance later decisions.

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

This session does not convert ECU into real money.

Encounter 1/1 · Your role: **Participant C**

Initial account per person and encounter: **100 ECU**.

There are three people: G, C, and V. C's quality is drawn independently each encounter. The alternative is automated and has quality 0 and option 0. G and C know C's quality; V knows its initial probability and observes the proposed option. V chooses C or the alternative.

Possible qualities: -40, 40 · Initial probability of high quality: 75,0%

G may offer to certify C's quality in exchange for C choosing option 1. Acceptance commits C to option 1 and publishes an exact certificate; G pays certification costs. Rejection commits C to option 0 and publishes neither a certificate nor the offer. If G makes no offer, C may choose 0 or 1 without a certificate.

Before voting, V observes neither rejected offers nor uncertified quality. Absence of a certificate does not by itself show whether an offer was made. Accounts and actual quality are revealed at the end of the encounter.

Initial accounts are renewed each encounter. Earnings are added across all active encounters; no single round is selected for payment. Accumulated balances do not finance later decisions.

Continue

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Figure 2.1: Effective resources and accounts before decisions

2.3 Conditional offer and commitment

In the reference condition, G observes quality and decides whether to offer verifiable disclosure in exchange for C committing to option 1. Given an offer, C may accept or reject. Acceptance fixes option 1 and issues the exact certificate, charging G the cost. Rejection fixes option 0 and publishes neither the certificate nor the offer's existence. Without an offer, C may freely choose 0 or 1, but no certificate exists.

The restriction after rejection is part of the model. C cannot reject certification and immediately choose option 1 as though no offer had occurred. Without an offer, both options are available. Do not confuse an uncertified choice of option 1 with acceptance. The report calculates acceptance only among observed conditional offers. Published information is verifiable: G cannot compose a false quality message or alter the realized draw. An offer to disclose and actual disclosure are different events. That distinction is essential for reconstructing costs and voter beliefs. A complete account of the sequence should name the private offer, the candidate's response, the public option, and whether a certificate was actually issued.



Communication decision

Encounter 1/1 · Your role: **Participant G**

Initial account per person and encounter: 100 ECU · Certificate cost: 10 ECU · Benefit if option 1 is implemented: 60 ECU

C's quality, known to you, is **40**

G may offer to certify C's quality in exchange for C choosing option 1. Acceptance commits C to option 1 and publishes an exact certificate; G pays certification costs. Rejection commits C to option 0 and publishes neither a certificate nor the offer. If G makes no offer, C may choose 0 or 1 without a certificate.

Would you like to make the certification offer?

- ☐ No
☒ Yes

Continue

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

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Figure 2.2: G observes quality and decides whether to offer certification

2.4 What the voter observes

Before voting, V observes the proposed option and any issued certificate. Without certification, V neither observes quality nor knows whether an offer was rejected. A history in which G made no offer and C chose 0 must be informationally equivalent to one in which G offered and C rejected, provided the same public option appears. The application preserves this equivalence and does not



Choose an option

Encounter 1/1 · Your role: **Participant C**

Initial account per person and encounter: 100 ECU · Reward for election: 60 ECU

C's quality, known to you, is **40**

G offers to certify your quality if you choose option 1.

Your choice

- ☐ Reject: option 0, no certificate
- ☒ Accept: option 1, with a certificate

Continue

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

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Figure 2.3: C accepts with option 1 or rejects with option 0

send private variables to the voting form's context.

Settlement reveals realized quality and allows account reconstruction, but this later feedback is not information available when choosing. Repeated encounters permit learning about classmates' behavior even though qualities are independently drawn. V should not treat a person's observed type frequency as a persistent quality: the protocol contains no such trait. The probability displayed on the ballot is the initial probability, rather than an automatically computed posterior. Inferring a posterior from an option or absent certification requires a strategy for G and C. The interface does not impose that inference on participants. During debrief, reconstruct the information set before evaluating whether a choice was well supported.

2.5 Comprehension with formative correction

Checkpoint

Welcome presents conduct rules and requests confirmation that they were read. Instructions define ECU and explain renewed accounts within the page body. Comprehension questions differ by module. Information checks the base, option-1 loss, V's high-quality account, and privacy of rejected offers. Mobilization checks the base, capacity, a losing candidate's account, and unchanged citizen ideals.

Each error displays the submitted answer, correct answer, and a rule or calculation explanation. Other responses remain in place, and correction does not reduce earnings. Questions use effective parameters: with policy loss 50, high quality, and base 100, the relevant account is 90. Do not turn comprehension into strategic advice about whether to disclose or whom to activate. Its purpose



Choose a candidate

Encounter 1/1 · Your role: **Participant V**

Initial account per person and encounter: 100 ECU · Loss from option 1: 30 ECU

Option proposed by C: **0**

There is no certificate. Quality and unpublished offers are not shown.

The alternative has quality 0 and option 0.

Possible qualities: -40, 40 · Initial probability of high quality: 75,0%

Your choice determines who implements the option.

- ☒ Choose C
☐ Choose the alternative

Continue

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

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Figure 2.4: Without a certificate, quality and rejected offers remain private



Choose a candidate

Encounter 1/1 · Your role: **Participant V**

Initial account per person and encounter: 100 ECU · Loss from option 1: 30 ECU

Option proposed by C: **1**
Exact quality certificate: **40**

The alternative has quality 0 and option 0.

Possible qualities: -40, 40 · Initial probability of high quality: 75,0%

Your choice determines who implements the option.

- ☒ Choose C
☐ Choose the alternative

Continue

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

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Figure 2.5: The ballot shows the option and issued exact certificate

is to establish that subsequent choices respond to understood rules. Resolve a misunderstanding before interpreting that person's behavior as a response to an incentive.



Review the marked questions. Each shows your answer and an explanation; your other answers are retained.

Understanding the rules

Resources and unit of account

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

This session does not convert ECU into real money.

Encounter 1/1 · Your role: **Participant V**

How many ECU does each person receive at the start of an encounter?

Your answer: 0. The correct answer is 100. Each person starts with 100 ECU, renewed each encounter.

How many ECU does V lose from option 1, holding quality fixed?

If V chooses high-quality C with option 1, what is V's account?

Can V observe rejected offers and uncertified quality before voting?

☒ No

☐ Yes

Continue

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Figure 2.6: Each error explains the correction while retaining other answers

Information, strategies, and welfare

3.1 Pooling without an intermediary

Pooling means that both C qualities choose the same option. If both choose 0 and V knows that strategy, observing the option does not distinguish types. With high-quality probability r , choosing C gives expected earnings of 100 plus r times 40 plus one minus r times -40 . At r equal to 0.75 this is 120 , exceeding the alternative's 100 . V may choose C without knowing the realization and still maximize expected earnings under that assumption.

This calculation does not require V to use the initial probability after every possible option. It requires both qualities to generate the observed option with the stipulated frequencies. Nor does it establish that an observed human profile is a sequential equilibrium. Supporting one requires best responses and consistent beliefs, including off-path histories. The book allows different pooling equilibria. The report uses pooling at 0 for a defined comparison, rather than announcing a universal behavioral prediction. Ask students to write the strategy before calculating an uncertified ballot's expected value. Otherwise, a correct arithmetic expression can conceal an unjustified assumption about what the public action reveals.

3.2 A conditional separating reference

Theoretical foundation

One useful theoretical reference has G offering certification only for high quality, C accepting and choosing 1, and low-quality C receiving no offer and choosing 0. V chooses C after observing certified high quality with option 1 and chooses the alternative at the other relevant histories. Absence of certification with option 0 identifies low quality along this path. Off-path beliefs must also be specified to support an equilibrium assessment.

Under reference parameters, V receives 110 with high quality and 100 when low quality leads to the alternative. Expected earnings are 107.5 . G obtains a net benefit of 50 when agreement produces option 1: sixty in policy benefit minus ten for certification. High quality compensates V for the concession because forty exceeds thirty. These inequalities support the separating reference without forcing humans to play it or making it unique. The program displays that calculation only when the relevant material conditions hold. A different realization is not itself evidence of irrationality. Distinguish a theoretical assessment, its expected account, and the decisions actually observed in a classroom encounter.

3.3 Truthful information and voter welfare

Compare those references at r equal to 0.75. Without a group and with pooling at 0, V obtains 120 in expectation. The conditional separating reference gives 107.5. The difference is -12.5 even though selection avoids electing low-quality C . The change improves the selected candidate's expected quality but imposes a costly policy when quality is high. Information can be truthful and voters rational; this conflict does not require false propaganda.

Public certification combined with option 0 gives a reference of 130: high quality yields 140 and the alternative yields 100 after low quality. That figure describes a strategy with option 0 and full information, rather than guaranteeing that every human candidate chooses 0. The comparison separates information, selection, and political price. The report's high-quality-selection rate may be identical across treatments even when low-quality election falls and alternative selection rises. Examine the complete winner distribution and V 's account rather than treating one rate as welfare. This is a useful example of how more accurate selection and lower voter earnings can coexist without any arithmetic inconsistency.

3.4 Probabilities and the comparison threshold

Write r for the probability of high quality, avoiding confusion with the low-quality probability used in some expressions in the book. Under reference accounts, choosing C in option-0 pooling gives 60 plus $80r$. V may choose the alternative's 100, so the reference is the maximum of those values. Conditional separation gives 100 plus $10r$. Above one half, the difference favoring separation is 40 minus $70r$.

Equality occurs at r equal to four sevenths, approximately 57.14%. At sufficiently high probabilities, the political price exceeds the benefit of excluding low quality. At r equal to 0.25, the no-group reference is 100 and the conditional reference is 102.5; at r equal to 0.50 they are 100 and 105. The sign depends on parameters rather than a general claim that groups always harm voters. Probability variants teach that dependence without changing screens or creating a new experimental mechanism for every number. Students should identify the range in which the alternative binds before simplifying the maximum expression.

Mobilization and electoral competition

4.1 Potential population and active electorate

The mobilization module represents eleven automated citizen units with ideals from 0 to 100 in steps of ten. Three units, at 20, 40, and 60, always participate. Eight others, at 0, 10, 30, 50, 70, 80, 90, and 100, participate only when activated. The full population's median is 50, whereas the initial electorate's median is 40. Keeping both distributions visible separates representation of voters from representation of the population.

In reference targeted mobilization, G may activate any subset of up to three additional units, including the empty set. G changes neither preferences nor transfers to citizens. Capacity restricts feasible sets rather than defining a hidden monetary budget. Mobilization is costless in the reference, with explicit per-unit costs in the relevant variants. These eleven citizens are not connected people; their votes follow a proximity rule with fractional ties. Human decisions are the selected set and the two platforms. This decision structure preserves the chapter's mechanism without requiring eleven additional participants per group. Its finite population is an explicit adaptation of the book's continuous electorate, rather than a literal replication.

4.2 The group chooses before platforms

The ordinary sequence starts with G's selection. Once it closes, both candidates observe the active units and simultaneously choose positions on the grid 0, 10, 20, and so on through 100. Each position is binding for its winner. Neither candidate observes the other's choice before confirming their own. Vote weights are then calculated and any winner tie is resolved by lottery.

G's reference ideal is 90, and its account is 100 minus half an ECU per point of distance from implemented policy. Candidates receive 100 plus 60 for winning and do not directly value policy. G's intervention may change where competition is attractive without directly changing candidate rewards. Interpreting an observed platform therefore requires identifying the electorate to which it responded. A before-and-after mobilization comparison should not assume candidates remain fixed. The adaptation leaves their responses to humans and separates the selected electorate from the political offers actually produced. This is the central distinction between merely recounting a fixed election and studying electoral competition after organized participation changes.

4.3 Automated votes, identities, and ties

Every active unit assigns one vote unit to the candidate nearest its ideal. Equal distance assigns one half to each candidate. Calculations use exact fractions without rounding scores before identifying



Select participating units

Encounter 1/10 · Your role: **Participant G** · Your ideal position: 90

Your ideal position: **90** · Maximum capacity per G: 3 · Cost per unit activated by you: 0 ECU

Ideals of always-active units: [20, 40, 60] · Ideals of available additional units: [0, 10, 30, 50, 70, 80, 90, 100]

Check at most the stated number. Leaving all unchecked selects the empty set.

- ☐ Position 0
- ☐ Position 30
- ☐ Position 70
- ☐ Position 90

- ☐ Position 10
- ☐ Position 50
- ☐ Position 80
- ☐ Position 100

Continue

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

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Figure 4.1: Identity selection with explicit capacity and cost



Choose a position

Encounter 1/10 · Your role: **Participant C 1**

Initial account per person and encounter: 100 ECU · Reward for election: 60 ECU

Ideals in the active electorate: [20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 100]

G participants' ideals: [90]

The candidate with the larger vote weight wins. A tie triggers an equal-probability lottery between both. The winner's position applies to the whole population, including inactive units.

Binding position (0, 10, ..., 100)

Continue

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

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Figure 4.2: Binding platform after observing the electorate

the maximum. An equal-weight result triggers a uniform lottery over the two candidates. Their identities are drawn; implemented policy is the winner's platform.

If both offer 50, any electorate divides its total weight equally. Policy is certainly 50 even though the office reward is random. If different positions tie, policy also becomes a lottery. Do not interpret a weight of three halves as people voluntarily splitting ballots: it is an automated protocol rule. Scores and the tied set are retained for reconstruction. An odd electorate does not eliminate ties when units are indifferent or platforms identical. Keep the absence of human ballots in mobilization separate from V's single human electoral decision in information. Counting the same event as both automated behavior and a human decision would misstate the evidence generated by the activity.

4.4 An example of composition and movement

Without mobilization, active ideals are 20, 40, and 60. Activating 70, 80, and 90 produces 20, 40, 60, 70, 80, and 90. The median becomes an interval from 60 to 70. This electorate may support platforms central to voters but to the right of the full population's median of 50. Selective mobilization is not simply movement toward representation of the complete population.

Suppose both candidates offer 70. Policy is then certain, and G at ideal 90 receives 90. If both offered 40 under the original electorate, G would receive 75. The fifteen-ECU difference illustrates the group's incentive under those continuations. It does not establish a full-game equilibrium: platforms must be best responses, and alternative selections must also be considered. The full population's mean virtual account under policy 70 is approximately 84.55, compared with 85.91 under 40. Intervention may favor the group while worsening that population measure. Always specify whose welfare is measured and which account function defines it. Candidate prizes and group earnings answer different distributional questions.

4.5 Finite medians and platform benchmarks

An even number of ideals can produce a median interval. The eleven-position grid and citizen masses can also generate several stable platform profiles. The program does not automatically import a unique-convergence theorem from a continuous electorate. For each realized electorate it enumerates all one hundred twenty-one platform pairs and checks every unilateral grid deviation. It preserves indifferences: a deviation leaving winning probability unchanged does not invalidate a pure equilibrium.

The report's stability label applies to platforms for that fixed electorate. It does not mean that G selected an optimal set or that the complete game is in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Lower and upper median endpoints are also recorded. These references test intuition while preserving the level of analysis. In class, select an observed pair and calculate whether either candidate could increase winning probability by moving. A profitable deviation rejects stability even if the winner implemented an apparently central policy. Platform choice is a human strategy; the realized lottery does not retrospectively establish whether it was a best response. Evaluate the probability distribution faced when the platform was chosen.

4.6 Targeting technology and capacity

Targeting means selecting identities using preferences. With eight additional units and capacity three there are ninety-three feasible sets: one empty set, eight singletons, twenty-eight pairs, and fifty-six triples. G need not exhaust capacity. Adding a unit may move the median favorably,

leave it unchanged, or change platform incentives less favorably. A maximum capacity is not an instruction to activate exactly that many units.

The one-unit-capacity variant preserves the remaining rules and examines a technological constraint. Compare selected sets and achieved median intervals, rather than only announced capacity. Public preferences and a small list allow an attainable-median frontier to be enumerated. That frontier describes technological possibilities, not a prediction of G's choice or a measure of campaign effort. Distinguishing feasibility from optimization connects the activity to Osborne's model, where a collection of mobilizable sets summarizes technological and budget constraints without imposing a particular monetary technology. Students can reject an infeasible proposal before discussing whether it would be desirable, then compare several feasible proposals using explicit continuation assumptions.

4.7 Untargeted mobilization and restricted sets

Under untargeted mobilization, G chooses only a number between zero and capacity. The system uniformly draws a subset of that size from the eight additional units. The realized set is revealed before platforms are chosen. Identities are sampled without replacement, and G cannot repeat an unfavorable draw. The condition preserves the potential population while changing technological precision.

A finite draw may produce an unusual electorate. Do not expect every realization to move the median smoothly toward 50 as in a continuous proportional comparison. Studying technology requires multiple realizations and a distinction between expected distributions and realized outcomes. Restricted-set mobilization offers only four choices: no units, 0–10–30, 30–50–70, or 80–90–100. Capacity is three, but G cannot choose any of the ninety-three arbitrary feasible sets. These rules show why an equal maximum number of contacts does not imply equal influence. Attainable composition and information about preferences matter too. When comparing conditions, report the actual set rather than assigning identical political effects to all choices of three units.



Select participating units

Encounter 1/10 · Your role: **Participant G** · Your ideal position: 90

Your ideal position: **90** · Maximum capacity per G: 3 · Cost per unit activated by you: 0 ECU

Ideals of always-active units: [20, 40, 60] · Ideals of available additional units: [0, 10, 30, 50, 70, 80, 90, 100]

G chooses only how many additional units to activate. The system uniformly draws a set of that size from the eight available units; G does not choose their identities.

Number of units to activate

Continue

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

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Figure 4.3: Selecting a count without choosing identities

Variants and comparisons

5.1 Intervention timing and cost

Late mobilization reverses the first two stages. Candidates simultaneously choose and close positions; G then observes both and selects additional units. This examines credible threats and the value of early commitment. Costly late mobilization adds five ECU per unit personally activated. Its natural comparison is costless late mobilization or early mobilization with the same cost, depending on the question.

If candidates have already chosen exactly the same position, electorate changes do not alter implemented policy. With positive costs, G can save by choosing the empty set. This local observation does not determine every continuation when platforms differ. A mobilization threat intended to punish deviation must be desirable at the history where it would be carried out. The book discusses why commitment conclusions can depend on costs. The finite adaptation examines that reasoning through explicit choices without announcing general equivalence between early and late outcomes. Hold accounts and technology constant when isolating timing. Otherwise, an observed difference combines a change in commitment with a change in the price of intervention.

5.2 Two groups with opposing ideals

The two-group extension uses four people: two G participants and two candidates. Group ideals are 10 and 90. Both may select up to eight additional units, choosing simultaneously without observing the other's selection before closing. The electorate contains the union of their sets plus the three always-active units. A unit selected by both votes only once. Candidates observe the closed union before choosing platforms.

Citizens acquire no loyalty to the group that activated them. Their votes follow their own ideals. Activation therefore does not guarantee support for a particular candidate. Group competition can broaden participation and moderate one selector's advantage. Nevertheless, the grid and finite electorate prevent automatic transfer of every continuous-model conclusion. Compare active population, offered positions, and accounts for both group ideals. Do not average their objectives as though they formed a shared social preference. Each G's account uses its own distance from the same implemented policy. Separate overlap in mobilization from duplicate electoral weight: the former is possible, while the latter is explicitly excluded.



Select participating units

Encounter 1/10 · Your role: **Participant G** · Your ideal position: 90

Your ideal position: **90** · Maximum capacity per G: 3 · Cost per unit activated by you: 0 ECU

Ideals of always-active units: [20, 40, 60] · Ideals of available additional units: [0, 10, 30, 50, 70, 80, 90, 100]

Closed positions

Candidate	Position
1	50
2	80

Check at most the stated number. Leaving all unchecked selects the empty set.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| ☐ Position 0 | ☐ Position 10 |
| ☐ Position 30 | ☐ Position 50 |
| ☐ Position 70 | ☐ Position 80 |
| ☐ Position 90 | ☐ Position 100 |

Continue

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

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Figure 5.1: Late mobilization observes both closed platforms

5.3 Conditional information: reference

Conditional retains high-quality probability 75%, certificate cost 10, group benefit 60, and V's policy loss 30. It is the basic mechanism with ten fixed encounters for comparison with extensions. G decides whether to offer certification; acceptance commits option 1.

Request separate predictions about offers, acceptance, and quality selection. More offers do not guarantee more certificates or higher welfare. Explaining G's account requires knowing whether certification occurred and which option was implemented. The three stages identify where an agreement breaks down. Avoid interpreting every proposed option 1 as an accepted bargain: the candidate may also choose it freely after no offer.

5.4 No group: uncertainty and observation

No_group removes communication. G remains an observer with a fixed account of 100, C knows quality and chooses 0 or 1, and V votes without certification. Retaining three people permits equal-size comparison without inventing an observer action.

Compared with conditional, this changes access to intermediation rather than merely message visibility. Examine proposed options and V's choices first. A fixed observer account does not measure an active group's profitability. When comparing social payments, identify programmed transfers and which people make economically relevant decisions under each rule. The absence of certification here is imposed by the institution and should not be interpreted as G's voluntary refusal to disclose.

5.5 Disclosure without a required concession

Unconditional lets G issue a certificate without requiring option 1. Issuance incurs the cost, while C retains both options. It compares a linked offer with communication lacking that commitment, rather than guaranteeing disclosure of every quality.

G still values policy rather than quality directly. G may decline to pay when expecting C to choose 0, so perfect information does not follow automatically. Compare certification, policy, and accounts. A reciprocity interpretation requires additional evidence: C may choose 1 because of electoral expectations, and one action does not identify a motive. Separate the group's freedom to disclose from the candidate's freedom to choose policy afterward.

5.6 Automatic public certification

Public_information publishes quality without a G decision or a certificate cost charged to people. G is an observer with a fixed base. C may choose 0 or 1, and V knows quality when voting. The rule separates information access from both conditional exchange and private publication costs.

V's account still depends on C's option. Under reference parameters, high quality may win with either option, but 0 gives V more. The expected maximum of 130 is therefore not a guaranteed behavioral prediction: it combines full information with the favorable option. Report actual options alongside certification so the comparison does not attribute every account difference to information alone.

5.7 High quality unlikely

Prior_low reduces high-quality probability to 25% while retaining conditional exchange. Choosing C under option-0 pooling yields 80 in expectation, compared with the alternative's 100. The separating reference gives 102.5. The comparison changes sign relative to the high-probability reference.

This teaches the value of screening out unfavorable quality under pessimistic prior uncertainty, without assuming a particular human strategy. Request the calculation and its supporting condition before play. Afterward distinguish variation in realized type composition from variation in decisions conditional on type. Small classes need not realize exactly one high type in every four draws because independent probabilities do not impose quotas.

5.8 Equally likely qualities and indifference

Prior_even gives each quality probability 50%. Under option-0 pooling, V receives expected earnings of 100 from C and 100 from the alternative. Indifference is materially valid: neither choice should automatically be classified as mistaken. The conditional reference gives 105.

Use this condition to distinguish a tie in expected accounts from an electoral tie. There is no automated ballot lottery here; V still chooses. Correct calculations retain both best responses when equal. Human frequencies may select between them, but payoffs alone do not identify that selection. This is a useful boundary case for teaching why an equilibrium correspondence can contain several actions.

5.9 Free certification

Cost_free sets certificate issuance costs to zero while retaining V's policy loss and G's benefit. Removing communication costs does not remove policy conflict. If certified high quality wins with option 1, V still receives 110 and G receives 160.

Compare issuance and accounts by role. Higher G earnings contain a mechanical component from avoiding the ten-ECU charge. Examine decisions rather than earnings alone when discussing behavior. Costless disclosure also need not make revealing low quality strictly preferable to silence; indifference can persist depending on continuation. State that comparison explicitly instead of equating zero price with a compulsory action.

5.10 Cost equal to the group benefit

Cost_high raises certification costs to 60 ECU, matching the benefit of implementing 1. If an agreement elects high-quality C, G ends with 100, equal to policy 0 without certification. The incentive inequality becomes weak, and the reference retains that indifference.

If certification occurs but the alternative wins, G receives 40. Costs depend on issuance rather than success. Compare both realizations with their probabilities under a specified strategy. Equality after a favorable result does not imply indifference about every offer or type. This condition is useful for preserving weak best responses without treating a costly unsuccessful certificate as free.

5.11 Low-cost concession for the voter

Conflict_low reduces option-1 loss from 30 to 10. High quality then gives V 130 and remains preferable to the alternative. The separating reference is 122.5, compared with option-0 pooling at 120. A smaller concession can reverse the welfare comparison without changing information structure.

This does not prove that every group intervention is beneficial. Quality, priors, and continuation still matter. Compare expected values before examining choices conditional on quality. Holding other parameters fixed locates the theoretical change in the political cost of the concession. The condition illustrates comparative statics rather than identifying an unrestricted policy recommendation.

5.12 Concession cost exceeding high quality

Conflict_high sets option-1 loss to 50. Even certified high quality yields V 90, below the alternative's 100. This deliberately violates the reference condition that high quality compensates the concession.

The report does not label the earlier separating reference valid for these numbers. This is an assumption-boundary exercise rather than a refutation of the book. Ask which inequality changes and which V response makes agreement unattractive to C. A truthful certificate can be electorally insufficient when its attached policy is too costly. Students should revise the continuation before recalculating G's incentive to offer.

5.13 Group benefit below certification costs

Group_gain_low reduces G's benefit to 5 while certification still costs 10. Accepted successful certification leaves G with 95. Compared with a continuation producing option 0 without certification, the offer is no longer profitable.

This condition also leaves the incentive range of the selected separating reference. It does not make every human offer impossible: people may expect different continuations without an offer. The exercise must state that counterfactual. Distinguish policy benefit, information cost, and office prize. They belong to different roles and must not be added to G's individual account as though the group also received the candidate's election reward.

5.14 Belief before the ballot

Beliefs adds V's high-quality probability forecast after observing option and certification but before voting. The response ranges from zero to one hundred and does not affect payments. It is recorded separately from the ballot and not shown to peers.

The forecast compares a stated belief with a later action. It is neither an incentivized probability elicitation nor automatic evidence of Bayesian updating. Exact certification implies a known probability of zero or one hundred; an uncertified history requires strategic assumptions. Use the extension to discuss inference while retaining the descriptive limitation. A match between belief and ballot also depends on the relevant option's payoff threshold.

5.15 Targeted mobilization: reference

Mobilize_targeted is the second module's reference. G at ideal 90 chooses up to three units before platforms. Activation has no monetary cost, and candidates know the closed electorate. Relevant comparisons preserve the potential population, accounts, and grid.

Record the selected set, its median interval, and both platforms. Counting three activated units without retaining their ideals discards the mechanism's central variable. Sets 0–10–30 and 80–90–100 have equal size but very different implications. Examine policy proximity to G alongside the complete population's virtual account. Candidate adaptation is part of the outcome rather than a nuisance to be held fixed automatically.

5.16 Random untargeted mobilization

Mobilize_random permits a count from zero to three and draws identities without replacement. G does not know the realized set when choosing the count, but knows its distribution and all possible preferences. Candidates observe the realized set before competing.

This separates control over intensity from control over composition. For an equal-size comparison, condition on the selected count and examine different draws. An isolated extreme result can be consistent with uniform sampling. Do not attribute system-drawn identities to G's targeting strategy. The choice of count remains a human action, while composition conditional on that count is generated by the institution.

5.17 No mobilization and full participation

Mobilize_none fixes the electorate at 20, 40, and 60. Mobilize_all activates all eight additional units and uses the complete population. Neither presents G with a selection form, but G's account still depends on distance from its ideal. This differs from the information control's fixed-account observer.

The pair offers transparent median references of 40 and 50. Platforms remain human choices. Do not replace observed outcomes with an assumed median: check the offered and winning positions. G's accounts may differ even without an action under either rule. Distinguishing an inactive decision role from an economically unaffected observer avoids a misleading payment comparison.

5.18 Technology with restricted sets

Mobilize_limited offers only the four instructed sets. It retains maximum capacity three, ideal 90, and zero activation cost. Comparison with unrestricted selection isolates the feasible-set restriction.

Identify a combination allowed in the reference but excluded here and explain its possible platform effect. Observing three activated units under both conditions is insufficient: one technology may exclude G's preferred composition. The empty set remains valid. This represents a concrete technological restriction without inventing an artificial campaign-spending budget. Analyze the available alternatives before describing a group's apparently unusual selection as a preference for a less favorable electorate.

5.19 Intervention after positions

Mobilize_after closes platforms first and displays both to G before allowing selection of up to three units. Compared with mobilize_targeted, it changes order and information at selection while retaining accounts.

G's response may be optimal given both platforms yet differ from what early commitment would achieve. When discussing threats, specify the history following a candidate deviation. Observing platforms does not automatically guarantee an advantage because it also changes candidate expectations. Evaluate additional information within the whole sequence. A comparison holding candidate behavior fixed addresses a local response problem rather than the institutional effect of moving later.

5.20 Cost per mobilized unit

Mobilize_cost subtracts five ECU for every unit G activates while preserving early selection. Activating three costs fifteen regardless of the winner. The cost is deducted from the group's account rather than paid to citizens.

Moving policy twenty points toward G's ideal reduces its distance loss by ten ECU. If three activations are required, that benefit does not cover fifteen under the specified comparison. Fix the platform continuation before calculating. This condition studies optimal size without replacing the central set-selection choice with a generic spending contest. A positive cost makes redundant activation economically consequential even when the electorate's winning policy is unchanged.

5.21 Capacity limited to one unit

Mobilize_capacity permits at most one additional unit, retaining the remaining targeted rules. It teaches reach constraints and discrete changes: adding one unit to three initial voters creates total weight four and possibly a median interval.

Compare attainable medians and platforms, distinguishing a binding restriction from capacity G elects not to use. A single activation in the reference does not prove that capacity three was irrelevant; unchosen alternatives may have shaped candidate expectations. Opportunities not taken remain part of the game. This distinction prevents revealed-action comparisons from silently equating different feasible sets.

5.22 Group with a low ideal

Mobilize_left changes G's ideal from 90 to 10 while preserving population, capacity three, and zero cost. The initial electorate's median is 40 and the full population's is 50, so universal activation need not move policy toward this group's ideal.

Selecting 0–10–30 alongside permanent units can produce a median interval from 20 to 30. Explain selection direction using the group's actual preference rather than assuming mobilization always shifts upward. The numbers are induced positions, not labels for existing political parties. Changing the favored location also shows why participation and representation cannot be evaluated without specifying whose objective is being considered.

5.23 Costly late intervention

Mobilize_after_cost combines closed platforms first with a five-ECU cost per unit. Compare with mobilize_after to isolate cost, or with mobilize_cost to isolate timing. Do not attribute both differences to one institutional feature.

Identical platforms give G the same policy under every set, making the empty selection preferable when it saves costs. Different platforms let activation change winning probabilities and expected policy value. Calculate that expected change before subtracting costs. One realized lottery winner cannot by itself establish whether mobilization was profitable when chosen. This condition is particularly useful for discussing credible, costly responses after platform commitments.

5.24 Competition between two groups

Mobilize_two_groups adds a G with the opposite ideal and lets each activate up to eight units. Their union removes duplicates. G at 10 and G at 90 value the same policy differently, and both make simultaneous selections hidden until closing.

Compare total participation, set overlap, and platforms with the single-group reference while recognizing the capacity difference. This condition studies organized competition rather than isolating the effect of adding one person. A single-factor causal test would require additional conditions equalizing other restrictions. The classroom comparison remains useful when its institutional changes are stated transparently instead of attributed to only one changed feature.

Results and data

6.1 Private report and aggregation units

The report pools every active encounter of the selected session, including when oTree opens the final technical round. It displays completed participant-encounters, pending rows, and settled group-encounters. Tables and distributions remain concealed until the instructor opens disclosure. Empty sessions explain that outcomes do not yet exist; a dash indicates an empty denominator rather than zero.

Information reports show certification, implemented option 1, quality selection, and V's mean account. The distribution distinguishes high-quality C, low-quality C, and the alternative. Acceptance is calculated among conditional offers rather than all groups. Mobilization reports show additional activated units, implemented position, the full population's mean virtual account, and platform-profile stability for the realized electorate. Position histograms use completed groups. Human accounts are displayed by role. Virtual accounts are neither added to human prizes nor paid to eleven students. Explain that distinction before projecting numbers, so a representation comparison does not inadvertently become a comparison of transfers. A treatment's displayed mean should always be accompanied by its module and denominator.

6.2 CSV, privacy, and pending decisions

Attention

The long download contains one row per participant and active encounter, with session, group, and person codes, language, treatment, module, and matching. It records decisions and parameters needed to reconstruct accounts. Information rows include offer, response, certificate, ballot, and quality, but private quality, offers, and latent outcomes remain empty until group settlement. Mobilization distinguishes own set, mobilized union, electorate, platform, scores, and outcome components.

An absent response is not converted to zero. A confirmed empty set is a valid choice distinct from pending selection. Native export also provides a wide structure with technical rounds; the long file and completion indicator are the recommended starting point for teaching analysis. Select the correct session and separate information from mobilization before computing means. Do not treat three role rows as three independent elections with the same winner. Sum completed earnings by person code for accumulated payments. For electoral outcomes retain one observation per group-encounter, avoiding triple or quadruple counting of elections. This distinction matters even when every row is technically complete and contains valid numerical values.




Figure 6.1: Information report revealed by the instructor




Figure 6.2: Separate report on composition and platforms




Figure 6.3: Partial-session progress with explicit pending rows

6.3 Completion, accumulation, and recovery

Individual results show the winner, implemented policy, and encounter account. Information reveals realized quality and the selected candidate's quality, which differ when the alternative wins. Mobilization displays electorate, weights, and ties. The final screen retains accumulated earnings without a button leading to an empty page.

If someone is waiting, use the monitor to identify the missing decision. Waiting may be correct while another role acts. Do not reset the database or recreate a session to solve an ordinary delay. Reload retains active assignment. After a server interruption, preserve the database, restart only this family's instance, and distinguish completed encounters from pending ones. Record communication or information incidents before interpreting classroom data. Recovery should restore the intended sequence rather than silently inventing decisions for an absent participant.



Activity completed

Accumulated earnings: **160,0 ECU**

Initial accounts are renewed each encounter. Earnings are added across all active encounters; no single round is selected for payment. Accumulated balances do not finance later decisions.

ECU stands for Experimental Currency Units. It is the unit of account for this activity.

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Figure 6.4: Stable closing of one active encounter

Teaching, exercises, and discussion

7.1 An introductory class

For an introductory class, use one conditional-information encounter. Draw the three people and automated alternative. Calculate V's account for each type under options 0 and 1. Then explain when G pays for certification and why a rejected offer stays private. After comprehension, allow individual choices without announcing a strategy everyone should follow.

At settlement, reconstruct offer, response, certificate, and ballot before revealing averages. Ask for an account calculation and an explanation of what V knew. Academic assessment should reward rule accuracy and reasoning rather than winning or guessing quality. If time is limited, retain one carefully explained comparison. Playing many treatments without discussing available information and accounts teaches less than reconstructing one encounter thoroughly. Students should leave able to identify the public history rather than merely remembering which candidate won.

7.2 Advanced module and comparisons

A two-class module can start with no_group and conditional while preserving V's probabilities and accounts. Assign pooling, separation, and the probability threshold afterward. A second class can compare targeted and untargeted selection with equal capacity. Explain that human roles have changed and citizen units are now automated.

For theory courses, request complete strategies and beliefs or best responses in the platform subgame. For empirical analysis, request a note defining units, outcomes, and a causal limitation. Do not attribute a difference to timing when costs, capacity, or group count also change. Repeated choices permit learning analysis, but inference must recognize recurring participants. A trajectory plot does not transform rounds into independent groups. State which contrast the assignment is intended to explain before students see the outcomes.

7.3 A script for discussing results

Feedback script

Begin by asking what each role chose and what information was available beforehand. Reconstruct an account and a counterfactual next. In information, ask whether absent certification distinguished rejection from no offer and which strategy would permit quality inference. In mobilization, ask who voted, which preferences remained unchanged, and how

candidates responded.

Only afterward introduce terms such as capture, selection, or commitment. A truthful certificate does not guarantee higher welfare; a larger electorate does not guarantee better representation under every criterion. Request a claim supported by an observation and a condition under which it would fail. Avoid attributing personal intentions, ideology, or moral quality to assigned positions. Feedback should connect rules with consequences rather than turn students into illustrations of a political judgment. Anonymous aggregates are usually sufficient for this purpose.

7.4 Worked information exercise

Assume high-quality probability 75%, high quality 40, low quality -40, and option-1 loss 30. In option-0 pooling, a voter choosing C receives 140 after high quality and 60 after low quality, giving expectation 120. Under conditional separation, certified high quality yields 110 and the alternative after low quality yields 100, giving 107.5.

Expected selected quality rises from 20 to 30, but the concession adds expected policy loss 22.5. V's net difference is ten minus twenty-two and a half, or -12.5. Under that separating reference, G's expected net gain above its base is 37.5: probability 0.75 times net benefit 50. C receives expected office rewards of 45. These are strategy-conditioned calculations rather than human data. Keeping each component separate reveals why improved quality selection need not dominate the concession's price.

7.5 Worked mobilization exercise

Consider electorate 20, 40, and 60 with platforms 30 and 70. Units at 20 and 40 prefer 30, while the unit at 60 prefers 70: 30 wins two to one. If G activates 80, 90, and 100 while platforms stay fixed, scores become two against four and policy 70 wins. The selected set changes a given election.

Now ask whether fixed platforms are a reasonable continuation. Against 30, the candidate at 70 can evaluate other positions; under the new electorate both may seek better responses. Early mobilization permits that adaptation, while late mobilization takes closed platforms as given. The same recount is valid as a local counterfactual without solving the early game's equilibrium. Request one possible deviation before drawing an institutional conclusion. This distinguishes a correct election calculation from an incomplete strategic argument.

Literature, scope, and operation

8.1 Sources and the Osborne adaptation

The primary source is Martin J. Osborne's *Models in Political Economy*, published in 2025. Chapter 12 examines money and influence in electoral competition. Section 12.1 organizes mobilization through feasible sets, while section 12.2 studies quality information exchanged for a concession. Osborne attributes the latter construction to Prat and relates it to Coate and Ashworth. This teaching protocol is not a literal replication of all those models.

The adaptation fixes laboratory accounts, a finite population, integer capacity, and grid platforms. It preserves the distinction between verifiable communication and false information, and between activating participation and changing preferences. Examples and report references are derived from these implemented rules. No book figures are reproduced. Before transferring theoretical conclusions, review the original assumptions about continuity, information, costs, and motivation. A named theorem is not a substitute for checking whether the classroom game meets its conditions.

8.2 Related theory and experimental evidence

Coate analyzes campaign financing with informative advertising and policy favors; Ashworth incorporates incumbency and financing into a voter-welfare model. These are related theoretical references rather than estimated effects of this activity. The application does not infer that all advertising is harmful or that a particular regulation should be adopted.

Gerber and Green's voter-contact experiment distinguishes mobilization technologies in an actual election. It helps discuss assigned intervention versus participation actually induced. Here activation guarantees automated participation by definition; the activity does not estimate the success rate of visits, mail, or calls. Do not transfer effect sizes to these virtual units. A useful comparison first identifies the human decision, programmed response, and experimental unit in each study. Classroom outcomes can illustrate a mechanism without replicating a field experiment or establishing its external validity.

8.3 Privacy, assessment, and limitations

Assigned roles do not identify personal ideology. Assess reasoning, not particular choices; protect identifiers. Screenshots use synthetic data. Report treatment, completed groups, and repetition for classroom aggregates. Causal inference requires assignment and enough independent units; classroom patterns alone do not establish it.

Configuration inventory and sources

Full configuration names are listed to avoid confusing mechanisms when selecting sessions.

Interest groups · EN · One encounter

`interest_groups_en_one`

Interest groups · EN · Ten encounters, fixed group

`interest_groups_en_fixed`

Interest groups · EN · Ten encounters, reassigned groups

`interest_groups_en_random`

Interest groups · EN · Information for a concession

`interest_groups_extended_conditional`

Interest groups · EN · No information intermediary

`interest_groups_extended_no_group`

Interest groups · EN · Disclosure without a required concession

`interest_groups_extended_unconditional`

Interest groups · EN · Automatic public certification

`interest_groups_extended_public_information`

Interest groups · EN · High quality unlikely

`interest_groups_extended_prior_low`

Interest groups · EN · Equally likely qualities

`interest_groups_extended_prior_even`

Interest groups · EN · Free disclosure

`interest_groups_extended_cost_free`

Interest groups · EN · Disclosure cost equals policy benefit

`interest_groups_extended_cost_high`

Interest groups · EN · Low-cost concession for the voter

`interest_groups_extended_conflict_low`

Interest groups · EN · Concession cost exceeds high quality

`interest_groups_extended_conflict_high`

Interest groups · EN · Group benefit below disclosure cost

`interest_groups_extended_group_gain_low`

Interest groups · EN · Belief before voting

`interest_groups_extended_beliefs`

Interest groups · EN · Targeted mobilization before platforms

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_targeted`

Interest groups · EN · Untargeted mobilization

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_random`

Interest groups · EN · Electorate without mobilization

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_none`

Interest groups · EN · All citizens activated

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_all`

Interest groups · EN · Restricted mobilization sets

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_limited`

Interest groups · EN · Mobilization after platforms

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_after`

Interest groups · EN · Cost per mobilized citizen

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_cost`

Interest groups · EN · One-citizen capacity

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_capacity`

Interest groups · EN · Group with a low ideal

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_left`

Interest groups · EN · Costly mobilization after platforms

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_after_cost`

Interest groups · EN · Two groups with opposing ideals

`interest_groups_extended_mobilize_two_groups`

9.1 References and attribution

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American Economic Association. Official JEL: A22, C92, D72, D82. <https://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/jelCodes.php?view=jel>

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