Instructors: games for class

Electoral Accountability and Political Selection

Study how the prospect of remaining in office changes an officeholder's behavior and how information allows voters to choose between politicians with different types. Basic: One encounter or four encounters with fixed or reassigned groups. Extended: Eight treatments on continuation, information, types, office value, term limits, and audits.

electoral disciplinepolitical accountabilitypolitical selectioncorruptioninformationpolitical economyA22C92D72D73

Participants

A five-person group: three voters and two politicians, labeled P and Q.

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Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply

Understand how spending choices aggregate into demand and how equilibrium with supply determines output and prices. Basic: One period, ten periods with the same economy, or ten periods with reassigned economies. Extended: Demand expansion and contraction, supply shock, fiscal stimulus, capacity, expectations, and coordination.

aggregate demandaggregate supplyprice levelpotential outputmacroeconomic expectationsA22C92E12E31E32

Participants

One economy with four households; the macro observation is one economy in one period.

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Digital Advertising Auction

Study position auctions, cost per click, relevance, reserve thresholds, information, and strategic learning. Basic: One round, ten periods with a fixed market, and ten periods with reassigned markets under relevance-weighted GSP. Extended: Benchmark GSP, first price, ranking without relevance, high reserve, concentrated clicks, similar clicks, limited feedback, and one-position second price.

position auctionsdigital advertisingcost per clickad qualitymarket designA22C92D44L86M37

Participants

A market of four advertisers with up to three sponsored positions per period.

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Credit with adverse selection

Relate credit terms to applicant composition and collection. Basic: One interaction; ten fixed-group rounds; ten rematched rounds. Extended: Reference and seventeen extensions, six rounds per condition.

adverse selectioncredit contractscollateralcredit rationingasymmetric informationproject riskC92D82G21

Participants

Interactive market with one lender and two applicants; two lenders under competition.

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Informative and Persuasive Advertising

Choose price and advertising against ten simulated consumers; compare awareness and valuation changes, increasing costs, profit, uncertainty, and welfare. Basic: One persuasive decision, one informative decision, or a two-decision comparison with low advertising costs. Extended: Five-decision learning, high advertising costs, alternative orders, cost changes, a five-ad limit, and costly production; each mechanism can be activated separately.

informative advertisingpersuasive advertisingmonopolymarginal costswelfarelearningA22C91D42D83L12M37

Participants

One person managing a firm in an independent market. Minimum one participant; any positive integer number of participants is valid.

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Alliances, Burden Sharing, and Collective Defense

Examine collective defense, coordination, and burden sharing. Basic: One encounter, ten fixed-group rounds, or ten rematched rounds retaining positions. Extended: Six-round reference and nine configurations: low and high threat, announcements, inequality, attacker, assistance, commitment, weakest link, and best shot.

collective defenseburden sharingcoordinationpromisesassistancealliance commitmentsA22C72C92D74F52H56

Participants

Four people per group; five in attacker, including a real external position.

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All-Pay Auctions and R&D Races

Participants compete for a prize and everyone pays their bid or investment, including those who lose, making rent dissipation and overinvestment observable. The basic version uses private values over one or ten rounds with fixed or reassigned groups. The extended version adds complete information, Tullock contests, R&D races, uncertain innovation, technology spillovers, and asymmetric research costs.

auctionsall-pay contestsrent dissipationinnovationgame theoryC72C92D44O31

Participants

A four-participant contest; decisions inside one group are not independent observations.

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Alternating-Offers Bargaining

Teach sequential bargaining, backward induction, subgame perfection, time discounting, delay, bargaining power, and behavioral departures. Basic: One negotiation, ten with a fixed partner, or ten with reassignment; at most five proposals and discount factors of 0.90 for both positions. Extended: Baseline, short horizon, asymmetric impatience, fixed delay cost, breakdown risk, outside option, and structured communication.

bargainingbackward inductiontime discountingsubgame perfectiongame theoryC72C78C92

Participants

One pair in one negotiation. In repeated editions, each pair-negotiation is an observation in the report.

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Armaments, Security Competition, and Inspections

Connect relative position, joint costs, and control institutions. Basic: One encounter, ten fixed-pair rounds, or ten rematched rounds. Extended: Reference plus six extensions: limit, agreement, inspection, stock, offense and defense, private valuations.

arms racessecurity dilemmaarms controlinspectionsoffense and defenseprivate informationA22C72C92D74F52F53

Participants

One pair of real participants with symmetric positions A and B.

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Asset Market (Bubbles)

Classic Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) design: an asset is bought and sold in a continuous market over several periods; at the end of each period every unit pays a random dividend (0, 8, 28 or 60 ECU) and the remaining expected value falls to zero. Cash and units carry over between periods. 5 periods (demo) or 15 periods, plus an extended version with chat.

asset marketsbubblesfundamental valueexpectationsexperimental financeC92D53G12G41

Participants

One market per session, no fixed roles: anyone buys or sells according to their cash and units. Works with any class size.

Duration

Approx. 15 min (5-period demo) · 60–75 min (fifteen 3-minute periods), including instructions and comprehension check.

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Bank Run

Five depositors simultaneously decide whether to withdraw early or keep their funds in the bank; too many withdrawals can exhaust liquidity and turn expectations into a bank run. The basic version offers one decision or ten periods with the same or reassigned banks. The extended version compares deposit insurance, greater liquidity, public information, private signals, visible history, and structured communication.

bank runsliquidityexpectationscoordinationfinancial institutionsC92D84G21

Participants

A bank with five depositors.

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Bargaining and Conflict

Study allocation and costly conflict under public information. Basic: One encounter; ten with a fixed pair; ten with reassigned pairs. Extended: Baseline and eleven extensions concerning probabilities, costs, communication, protocol, divisibility and risk.

bargaininginternational conflictdisagreement costsbargaining powerindivisibilitycommunicationA22C78C92D74

Participants

Pair per complete encounter; two persistent actors A and B.

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p-Beauty Contest

Teach strategic interaction, iterated dominance, Nash equilibrium, level-k reasoning, and learning. Basic: Four configurations per language: p=2/3 for one and ten rounds, plus one-shot p=1/2 and p=3/4. Extended: Eight configurations per language covering p, feedback, groups, range, and beliefs.

iterated dominancelevel-k reasoningNash equilibriumlearninggame theoryC72C92D83

Participants

A group of participants: the whole session or small groups.

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Beer Game: Inventory and Bullwhip Effect

Teams of four manage the stages of a supply chain and place orders while facing delivery delays, inventories, and backlogs, with the goal of reducing total cost. The basic versions compare constant demand, an unexpected demand step, and a 24-week simulation. The extended version changes information, communication, delivery delays, decision support, order batching, and promotions.

supply chainsinventorybullwhip effectcoordinationinformationC92D21M11

Participants

One chain of four participants.

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Price Competition (Bertrand)

Cournot's twin on the same market (demand 130 − p, unit cost 10): each firm posts a price and all demand goes to the cheapest one. Duopoly for one round or ten rounds with a fixed or reassigned rival, plus an extended version (monopoly, three and four firms, reassigned markets, chat, no calculator, each rival's result shown).

oligopolyprice competitionBertrand paradoxcollusionindustrial organizationC72C92D43L13

Participants

Markets of 2 firms (1, 3 or 4 in the extended version). Works with any class size: leftover participants join the first markets. Same design as Cournot so both can run in parallel.

Duration

Approx. 15–20 min (one round) · 35–50 min (ten rounds), including instructions and comprehension check.

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Big Five and Economic Decisions

personalityBig Fivetrait measurementself-reportsindividual heterogeneitybehavioral economicsA22C83C91D91

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Big Push and Persistent Capital

Coordinate investments to reach a collective threshold and examine persistence after a temporary intervention. Basic: One interaction; ten periods with a fixed group; ten periods with rematched groups. Extended: Reference and ten extensions: announcements, observable first choice, partial reimbursement, temporary subsidy, external contribution, persistent capital, capital and announcements, one-time capital grant, high initial capital and announced destruction.

big pushinvestment externalitiesthresholdscoordinationcapital accumulationtemporary interventionsA22C72C92D62E22O41

Participants

An economy of four participants; repeated periods within an economy, or rematching in the static core.

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Bomb Risk Elicitation Task

Make visible the tradeoff between an increasing potential reward and an increasing probability of losing it. Basic: Static choice, dynamic collection, and a comparison of both modes. Extended: High stakes, 25- and 400-box grids, random order, faster collection, five decisions, and neutral wording.

risk attitudesrisk elicitationdecisions under uncertaintybehavioral economicsC91D81D91

Participants

Any number. Ten or more support a useful histogram, but a smaller class can still support descriptive discussion.

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Bonds, Yield and Default

Value dated bond payments and distinguish promised yield, effective return and recovery. Basic: One market; ten fixed-group or randomly reassigned markets. Extended: Nineteen rate, coupon, maturity, risk, priority, information, funding and resale conditions.

bond valuationauctionsyield to maturitydurationdefault riskrecovery and priorityC91C92D44G12G24G33

Participants

Hybrid: indicative individual valuation and four-investor, two-bond auction.

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Corruption and Bribery

One person offers a payment to an official, who decides whether to grant a permission affecting a third party. Includes one encounter, ten rounds with fixed or reassigned groups, and extensions on audits, sanctions, costly reporting and amnesty, decision histories, intermediation and absence of external harm. The report separates offers, permissions, detection, reporting and role-specific payoffs to discuss reciprocity, deterrence and externalities. Basic: One round; ten with fixed groups; ten with rematching. Extended: 9 configurations per language, including controls.

corruptionbriberyreciprocityexternalitiesauditsreportingA22C72C92D62D73K42

Participants

Three people per C/F/T group; four with intermediary I. Rematching and history require at least two complete groups.

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Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation

P decides whether to delegate a policy to A, who has information about the state and a different objective. Includes one round, ten with fixed pairs or rematching, and extensions on alignment, information noise, bounded delegation, monitoring and hierarchical replacement. The report separates authority, recommendations, policy accuracy and bias, and payoffs by role. Basic: One round; ten with fixed groups; ten with rematching. Extended: 10 configurations per language, including controls.

delegationasymmetric informationstrategic communicationdiscretionmonitoringhierarchical accountabilityA22C72C92D73D82D83

Participants

Two people per P/A pair; four for hierarchy. Rematching requires at least two complete pairs.

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Confidence Calibration and Trading

Separate confidence calibration, relative beliefs and financial trading. Basic: One market; ten fixed-group or randomly reassigned periods. Extended: Fourteen feedback, information, commission, liquidity and management conditions.

confidence calibrationprobabilistic beliefstrading volumetransaction costsfinancial informationmanagement incentivesC91C92D83G14G41

Participants

Hybrid: private individual measurements followed by an eight-person market.

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Call Market (Batch Clearing Auction)

Buyers and sellers with private values and costs simultaneously submit one sealed order; the market clears once per period at a single uniform price for every trade. Fourth institution of the market battery, to compare with the double auction, the pit market and posted offers. One period or 8 periods, plus an extended version with chat.

market institutionscompetitive equilibriumcall auctionefficiencyinduced valuesC92D41D44D47

Participants

One market per session; about half buyers and half sellers. Works with any class size (recommended: 12 or more).

Duration

Approx. 10–15 min (one period) · 25–35 min (eight periods or the chat variant), not counting discussion.

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Carbon Market

The whole class trades a product in a continuous double auction; every unit sold pollutes and its environmental cost is shared by everyone. After three free-market periods (which overproduce), every unit sold requires a permit: sellers buy them in a uniform-price auction or receive them for free and trade them among themselves. Students see the emissions cap, the permit price, the pass-through to the product price and the rents from free allocation (Plott, 1983; Montgomery, 1972). Extended version: Pigouvian tax, maximum-cost standard or no policy.

externalitiesemission permitsemissions tradingPigouvian taxdouble auctionenvironmental policyC92D62H23Q52Q58

Participants

The whole class in one market, half buyers and half sellers; from 20 students (with 22 or more: free market of 11 units at 150, social optimum of 9 units, 9 permits per period). With fewer than 20 the policy does not change the optimal quantity.

Duration

35–45 min (8 periods of 150 s; with free permits, 90 s more per period to trade them). Not counting discussion.

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Centipede Game

Teach backward induction, subgame perfection, strategic reasoning, reciprocity, and the descriptive limits of theory. Basic: Three configurations per language: one game; 10 with a fixed partner; 10 with rematching. Extended: Nine configurations per language covering horizon, payoffs, roles, communication, strategies, and termination.

backward inductionsubgame perfectionreciprocitytrustgame theoryC72C92D91

Participants

Pair in each game. The report separates decisions and payoffs for Person 1 and Person 2.

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Clientelism, Brokers, and Ballot Secrecy

A candidate distributes resources to five voters choosing C or R. Compare advance and contingent transfers, ballot secrecy, brokers, and universal benefits. Discuss majority outcomes, material incentives, reciprocity, and the information available to each role. Basic: One interaction, ten fixed-group rounds, or ten rounds with voter reassignment. Extended: Full and partial observation; conditional payment; private, transparent, or reviewed brokerage; universal mode and productivity; public or private heterogeneous values.

electoral clientelismballot secrecyreciprocitypolitical brokeragemonitoringdistributive politicsA22C73C92D72D73

Participants

One candidate and five voters; broker variants add a seventh participant. R is system-controlled.

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Coordination and Collective Action

Analyze coordination, thresholds, costs and information in producing a collective outcome. Basic: One interaction, ten fixed-group rounds or ten rematched rounds. Extended: Twelve eight-round configurations: reference and variants on thresholds, information, costs, sequence, announcements and removal.

collective actionparticipation thresholdscoordinationprivate and public informationleadershipcollective resistanceA22C72C92D72D83

Participants

Six members; seven people when A chooses a removal.

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Collective Actions and Redress for Dispersed Harm

Connect funding, membership, representation, and redress in actions for dispersed harm. Basic: One case; ten with fixed groups or rematching with stable roles. Extended: 9 conditions, including the reference; ten cases.

collective actionsaccess to justicelitigation costscollective representationredressC92K41D71

Participants

a group of 4 people per case

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Common-Value Auction

Observe how bidders use imperfect signals and why winning can reveal an overly optimistic estimate. Basic: First-price sealed bid: one round, ten fixed-market rounds, or ten reassigned-market rounds. Extended: Ascending reconstruction, high or low precision, eight bidders, public signal, and limited feedback.

auctionscommon valuewinner's curseinformationgame theoryC72C92D44D82

Participants

A four-bidder market; the intense-competition treatment uses eight.

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Common Budget and Local Projects

Explain concentrated project benefits, shared costs and institutional selection. Basic: One round, ten fixed-group rounds or ten randomly rematched rounds. Extended: Fifteen six-round conditions: financing, caps, review, voting, debt and project quality.

common fiscal pooldistributive spendingbudget institutionslegislative coalitionsintergenerational debtproject evaluationA22C92D72H61H63H72

Participants

Interactive groups: three districts; four with a reviewer; six with a future cohort.

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Common-Pool Resource Game

Groups of four: each member chooses an integer extraction effort between 0 and 5 and receives 100 + e(25 - Q) ECU, where Q is the group's total effort. Choosing 5 maximizes own payoff; joint income is maximized at Q = 12 or 13. One round or ten rounds with a fixed or a reassigned group, plus an extended version (structured communication, group-voted rule, peer sanctions, external rule).

common-pool resourcessocial dilemmasself-governanceinstitutionscooperationC92D62D70D91Q20

Participants

Groups of 4; the class needs a number of participants divisible by four. With reassigned groups, five or more groups avoid repeated matches.

Duration

20–30 min (one round) · 45–60 min (ten rounds or an institutional variant), including instructions and comprehension check.

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Comparative Advantage

Two countries with different productivities decide what to produce and trade, allowing the class to compare autarky, specialization, terms of trade, and consumption possibilities. The basic version separates production and exchange and offers one or ten rounds. The extended version changes absolute advantage, tariffs, terms of trade, communication, productivity, and Cobb–Douglas preferences.

comparative advantageopportunity costspecializationtradegains from tradeA22F11C92

Participants

One pair containing a Country A and a Country B.

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Democratic Consolidation and Coups

Explain how anticipated reversal affects redistribution and regime stability. Basic: One round; ten with fixed group; ten with rematching preserving roles. Extended: Twelve conditions, six rounds each: reference, costs, protected menu, crises, persistence, guarantees and information with announcements.

democracyredistributionthreat of breakdownminority protectioninstitutional commitmentregime stabilityA22C92D31D72D74C73

Participants

Four people: one A and three B; B vote and A can attempt reversal.

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Consumer Choice

Each student allocates income between two goods under a budget constraint and observes the resulting bundle and utility. The basic versions change income, the price of X, the price of Y, or several budgets together. The extended version adds a Cobb–Douglas benchmark, Hicks and Slutsky compensation, preference shifts, income transfers, taxation, rationing, and revealed-preference tests.

consumer choicebudget constraintpreferencesdemandwelfareA22D11D12

Participants

One person; no matching is required.

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Contracts, Investment, and Remedies

Study specific investment, contractual performance, and remedies for nonperformance. Basic: One encounter; ten with fixed partners; ten with reassigned partners. Extended: Fourteen presets per language covering remedies, clauses, release bargaining, enforcement, history, and cost probabilities.

contractsspecific investmentbreach remediesrenegotiationcontract enforcementreputationK12D86C78C92

Participants

Interactive A/B pair in each encounter; stable positions.

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Acquisitions and Corporate Control

Explain tender offers, shareholder coordination and transfers of corporate control. Basic: One market; ten with a fixed group or role-preserving reassignment. Extended: Fourteen ownership, purchase-rule, competition, cost and information conditions.

tender offerscorporate controlshare ownershiptoeholdspivotal shareholdersfree-rider problemC92D82G32G34

Participants

One bidder and four shareholders; two bidders and four shareholders under competition.

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Quantity Competition (Cournot)

Each firm chooses how many units to produce and the price depends on total market output (P = 130 − Q, unit cost 10). Duopoly for one round or ten rounds with a fixed or reassigned rival, plus an extended version (monopoly, three and four firms, reassigned markets, chat, no calculator, each rival's result shown).

oligopolyimperfect competitionNash equilibriumcollusionindustrial organizationC72C92D43L13

Participants

Markets of 2 firms (1, 3 or 4 in the extended version). Works with any class size: leftover participants join the first markets. With reassigned rivals, 5 or more markets avoid repeated matches.

Duration

Approx. 15–20 min (one round) · 35–50 min (ten rounds), including instructions and comprehension check.

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Court Congestion, Deadlines, and Access to Justice

Compare priority, review, adjournments, and performance incentives in a capacity-constrained office. Basic: One case; ten with fixed groups or rematching with stable roles. Extended: 8 conditions, including the reference; ten cases.

court congestiondeadlinescase managementadjournmentsaccess to justiceC92K41D73

Participants

a group of 4 people per case

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Credit Market, Interest, and Inflation

Lenders and borrowers interact in a market where the supply and demand for funds determine credit and interest rates, while real payoffs depend on inflation. The basic version offers one or ten rounds with fixed or reassigned markets. The extended version compares certain inflation, upward and downward surprises, uncertainty, indexed contracts, and a ceiling on the nominal interest rate.

credit marketinterest rateinflationnominal contractsexpectationsC92E43E31

Participants

A ten-person market with five lenders and five borrowers.

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Cognitive Reflection Test

Teach cognitive reflection, intuitive errors and limits of inference. Basic: Three-problem CRT, preserving Frederick (2005) numerical structures. Extended: Seven-problem CRT from Toplak and colleagues (2014), plus separate hypothetical decisions.

cognitive reflectionintuitive responsesnumerical reasoningdecisions under riskmeasurement and familiarityA22C91D81D91

Participants

Person; individual activity without matching or waiting.

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Exchange Rates and Speculative Attacks

Understand how fundamentals, expectations, and coordination among speculators can determine whether a fixed exchange rate survives or collapses. Basic: One round; ten rounds with the same economy; or ten rounds with random reassignment across economies. Extended: Benchmark, low reserves, high reserves, private signals, public announcement, interest-rate defense, capital controls, and external support.

exchange ratesspeculative attackscurrency crisesglobal gamesinformationA22C92D82F31F33

Participants

One economy formed by six participants. In repeated designs, choices by the same person or economy are not independent observations.

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Privacy, Consent, and Data Rights

Explore consent, information externalities, compensation, and collective control of fictional data. Basic: One case; ten with fixed groups or rematching with stable roles. Extended: 9 conditions, including the reference; ten cases.

privacyconsentdata rightsinformation externalitiescompensationC92D62K24

Participants

a group of 3 people per case

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Hidden effort and debt contracts

Understand how the residual from a financial contract shapes subsequent activity. Basic: One interaction; ten fixed-pair rounds; ten rematched rounds. Extended: Reference and nineteen extensions, six rounds per condition.

hidden actiondebt contractslimited liabilityincentive compatibilitymonitoringcollateralC92D82D86G21G32

Participants

Interactive lender-borrower pair.

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Status Quo and Defaults

Each student chooses among alternatives when one option may be preselected, although it can always be changed before confirmation, making inertia and active choice observable. The basic version studies the status quo, organ donation, and automatic enrollment. The extended version changes the default level, green energy, privacy, implicit recommendation, switching costs, and information.

status quo biasdefaultschoice architecturenudgesbehavioral economicsC91D91D04

Participants

Individual activity (no pairs, no wait pages). Any number of participants; six or more give balanced arms; three-treatment arms are exactly balanced with multiples of three.

Duration

Approx. 12–18 min to answer and 20 min of discussion (core); less for one module, more for the full diagnostic.

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De Jure and De Facto Power

Distinguish de jure power, de facto influence, and implementation of a distributive decision. Basic: One encounter; ten with fixed pairs; ten with reassignment. Extended: Nine conditions on rights, protection, organization, limits, observability, and accumulation.

political powerinstitutional reformpolicy capturecitizen organizationinformal influenceinstitutional persistenceA22C72C92D02D72D74

Participants

One pair with constant positions A and B.

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Democratic Erosion and Emergency Powers

Analyze when citizens delegate power to avoid gridlock and how an Executive uses the resulting discretion. Basic: One interaction, ten rounds with a fixed group, or ten independent rematched interactions. Extended: Gridlock risk, a gridlock-by-cap factorial, persistence, affinity, sunset, and judicial review.

democratic erosionemergency powerschecks and balancespolitical gridlockdelegationpolitical economyA22C92D02D72P16

Participants

Group of six: one Executive and five Citizens.

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Democratization as Redistributive Commitment

Show why surrendering political power can make future redistribution credible when a current promise cannot. Basic: One or four encounters with a nonbinding promise, temporary threat, and median citizen vote under democracy. Extended: Eight conditions: benchmark, binding promise, costly threat, persistent threat, repression, partial suffrage, inequality, and crisis.

democratizationfranchise extensionredistributionpolitical commitmentconflictpolitical economyA22C92D72D74P16

Participants

Group of four: one elite and three citizens. Attendance must be divisible by four.

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Deterrence, Reputation, and Credibility

Examine when a threat of resistance deters a challenge and how information, capacity, commitment, and reputation change its credibility. Basic: One encounter; ten encounters with a fixed partner; ten encounters with partner reassignment. Roles remain constant. Extended: No message, known cost, backing-down cost, contingent deposit, verified history, history observed with error, limited capacity, and material preparation.

deterrencethreat credibilityreputationprivate informationcommitmentinternational conflictA22C72C92D74F51F52

Participants

A pair consisting of A, who holds the initial position, and B, who may challenge it. The number of participants must be even; reassignment needs at least four people.

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Dictator Game

One person unilaterally decides how to divide an endowment with another, so the distribution of transfers can be used to discuss self-interest, fairness, and generosity. The basic version offers one or ten rounds with fixed or reassigned partners. The extended version adds taking, earned endowments, third-party punishment, social information, identity, efficiency, two recipients, and observability.

altruismsocial preferencesfairnessrepeated gamesbehavioral economicsC91C92D64D91

Participants

Pairs (2 per group). With random partners, 20 or more students avoid repeated matches. The three-person treatments of the extended version (third-party punishment, two recipients) need a number of participants divisible by 3.

Duration

15–20 min (one round) · 30–40 min (ten rounds), including instructions and comprehension check.

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Two-Level Diplomacy and Domestic Ratification

International bargaining and domestic constraints. Basic: One encounter; ten fixed-group rounds; ten rematched rounds retaining positions. Extended: Six-round reference and ten institutional comparisons developed in chapters 3–5.

international bargainingdomestic ratificationbargaining constraintsprivate informationsectoral compensationparliamentary confidenceA22C78C92D72F51F53

Participants

Eight people: two negotiators and six legislators in two countries.

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Disposition effect

Relate gain realization, historical references and selling decisions. Basic: One date; eight dates with chosen sales; eight with liquidation and repurchase. Extended: Reference plus seventeen extensions of information, presentation, prospects, costs, taxes, orders and management.

disposition effectrealized gains and lossesreference pointsselling decisionstransaction costsdelegated managementA22C91C92D81G11G41

Participants

Individual; delegated management crosses payments within anonymous pairs.

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Continuous Double Auction

One market for the whole class: buyers and sellers with private values and costs trade one unit per period in real time, posting prices and accepting the best opposing offer (Smith, 1962). One period or eight periods, plus an extended version with chat.

competitive marketsprice discoveryefficiencyinduced valuesmarket institutionsC92D41D44D47

Participants

One market per session; about half buyers and half sellers. Works with any class size (high-rank participants are extramarginal by design).

Duration

Approx. 15 min (one period) · 45–60 min (eight 3-minute periods), including instructions and comprehension check.

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Double Marginalization

Understand how successive markups raise final price and reduce sales and joint profit. Basic: One interaction, ten fixed-partner rounds, and ten reassigned-partner rounds in Spanish and English. Extended: Alternating positions, integration, wholesale cap, two-part tariff, retailer offer, demand uncertainty, and distribution cost.

vertical relationsdouble marginalizationcontractsvertical integrationindustrial organizationC92D43L22L42

Participants

A vertical channel formed by a manufacturer and a retailer.

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Sanctions, Concessions, and Economic Coercion

Separate demand, threat, imposed sanction, concession, and withdrawal; examine how costs and outside options affect economic coercion. Basic: One encounter, ten encounters with a fixed pair, or ten encounters with pair reassignment. Each actor starts with 100 ECU. Extended: Damage restitution, higher sender cost, coalition support, third-party evasion, and separate government and population accounts.

economic coercioninternational sanctionsbargainingconcessionsevasiondistributional costsA22C72C92D74F51F52

Participants

A pair consisting of sender A and target B, with roles fixed throughout the session.

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Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation

Understand how saving turns current output into investment, how investment changes future capital, and why an economy faces a tradeoff between current and sustainable consumption. Basic: One decision; ten periods with low initial capital; or ten periods with high initial capital. Extended: Benchmark, high depreciation, population growth, productivity takeoff, capital destruction, low-capital trap, AK technology, and golden-rule information.

economic growthcapital accumulationsavingsteady stateproductivityA22C91E22O41

Participants

One participant manages one independent economy. The descriptive unit is the economy-period; repeated decisions by one person are not independent replications.

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Two-Candidate Election

Two candidates choose policy positions and voters support the candidate closest to their preferences, allowing the class to study convergence, differentiation, and the median voter. The basic version offers one or ten elections with fixed or reassigned electorates. The extended version introduces policy-motivated candidates, polarization, valence, hidden preferences, public polls, costly voting, and two-dimensional competition.

electoral competitionmedian voterproximity votingpolitical economyC92D72

Participants

Nine participants: candidate A, candidate B, and seven voters.

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Electoral Entry and Citizen Candidates

Study costly entry, representation, and elections Basic: One encounter, ten fixed, ten reassigned, in ES/EN Extended: Fifteen treatments per language; 36 configurations and 4 rooms overall

electoral entrycitizen candidatesspatial competitionstrategic votingcandidacy costsplatform commitmentA22C72C92D72

Participants

Group during one encounter; repetitions are not independent

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Electoral Systems and Strategic Voting

Compare how electoral rules and information transform preferences and ballots into collective outcomes. Basic: One election; ten with a fixed electorate; ten with rematching and stable individual preferences. Extended: Basic modes, a six-election reference, runoff, approval, Borda, public composition, intention polls, and proportional representation with or without a threshold.

electoral systemsstrategic votingsocial choicevoting rulesproportional representationelectoral informationA22C72C92D71D72

Participants

Nine-voter electorate: four prefer A, three prefer B, and two prefer C.

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Authoritarian Survival and Elite Pacts

Study how a leader distributes resources to sustain a coalition and how elites coordinate support, challenge, and succession under different institutions. Basic: One interaction, ten rounds with a fixed group and succession, or ten independent rounds with rematching. Extended: Control, communication, private offers, council veto, elected succession, and a coercive apparatus.

authoritarian survivalelite pactssupport coalitionspolitical coordinationpolitical successionpolitical economyA22C72C92D72D74

Participants

A five-person group in the central design: one leader and four elites. The coercion variant uses six participants.

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Emergence of Money and Media of Exchange

Explain how objects not desired for consumption can facilitate later exchange. Basic: One encounter, ten fixed-pair encounters, or ten randomly rematched encounters. Extended: Eleven conditions per language including the reference: costs, information, networks, horizon, and tokens.

double coincidence of wantsmedia of exchangestorage costsbilateral searchmonetary circulationfiat moneyA22C92D83E40

Participants

Independent twelve-person economy: four people in each of three types.

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Endowment Effect and WTP/WTA Gap

Participants act as buyers, sellers, or neutral choosers and value or exchange a good, allowing comparisons of willingness to pay, willingness to accept, and trading rates. The basic version combines hypothetical valuation, incentivized valuation, and exchange. The extended version changes possession, reference prices, information, ownership expectations, experience, mechanism training, and market reconstruction.

endowment effectwillingness to pay and to acceptreference dependenceBDM mechanismbehavioral economicsC91D12D91

Participants

Individual activity (no pairs, no wait pages). Any number of participants; six or more cover the three roles (buyer, seller, neutral chooser). An incentivized session requires handing over the good or an equivalent voucher.

Duration

Approx. 10–15 min (one module) · 25–35 min (full diagnostic), plus discussion.

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Equity Issuance and Price Formation

Understand primary issuance, cash ownership and subsequent price formation. Basic: One market; ten with a fixed group or random reassignment preserving roles. Extended: Fifteen placement, information, lock-up, financing and public-history conditions.

equity issuanceprimary placementprice formationasymmetric informationshare allocationsecondary marketC92D44D82G14G32

Participants

Interactive five-person market: founder/issuer and four investors.

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Escalation and Shared Risk

Examine how continuation in a crisis exposes both actors to shared risk and how different exit institutions affect escalation. Basic: One crisis; ten crises with a fixed partner; or ten crises with partner reassignment between crises. Every crisis can contain up to five internal steps. Extended: Constant risk, structured communication, asymmetric consequences, a rising cost of backing down, negotiated exit, and emergency mediation.

escalationshared riskcrisis bargainingcommunicationmediationinternational conflictA22C72C92D81D74F51

Participants

A pair consisting of Actor A and Actor B. The number of participants must be even; partner reassignment requires at least four participants.

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Anomalies of Expected Utility Theory

Batteries of individual lottery decisions that test the independence axiom, choice under ambiguity, the reduction of compound lotteries and dependence on the elicitation procedure. One completed decision is drawn at random and valuations use the BDM rule. An Allais module, an Ellsberg module or both, plus an extended version (reflection, common ratio, isolation, calibration, preference reversal and a full 17-decision diagnostic).

independenceambiguityAllais paradoxEllsberg paradoxprospect theoryC91D01D81D91

Participants

Any number; each student decides individually and privately, with no waits for anyone else. No even number is required. Allais needs two decisions, Ellsberg two, the basic core four and the full diagnostic seventeen.

Duration

Depends on the module: two decisions (Allais or Ellsberg), four (basic core) or seventeen (full diagnostic), plus the reveal and the discussion.

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Evidence, Deliberation and Collective Decisions

Examine evidence aggregation, errors, and collective decision rules. Basic: One case, ten cases with fixed panels, or ten with reassignment. Extended: Eleven variants of rules, messages, error costs, sources, reliability, and review.

evidencedeliberationcollective decisionsprivate informationdecision errorsreviewC92D71D82K41

Participants

An independent case decided by a panel of three; two connected panels for review.

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Exchange and General Equilibrium

Connect exchange, resource constraints, distribution and price coordination. Basic: One interaction, ten rounds with fixed partners, or ten with random reassignment. Extended: Sixteen treatments varying endowments, preferences, information, fees, constraints, proposal rights and prices.

pure exchangegeneral equilibriumEdgeworth boxPareto efficiencyendowments and distributionprice adjustmentA22C92D31D51D61

Participants

A bargaining pair; a four-person market in posted-price treatments.

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Executive, Legislature, and Parliamentary Confidence

Examine how tenure, confidence, agenda, veto, chambers, elections, and coalitions shape approval and distribution of a public budget. Basic: One round with fixed tenure; six rounds with fixed tenure; six rounds with optional confidence. Extended: Nine conditions: benchmark, optional or mandatory confidence, open agenda, veto, parliamentary and presidential packages, bicameralism, and observable coalition.

executive-legislative relationsconfidence voteslegislative bargainingagenda powervetopolitical institutionsA22C92D71D72H41

Participants

A seven-person group for core mechanisms and a twelve-person group for parliamentary and presidential packages. In repeated designs, the group trajectory is the natural unit.

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Inflation Expectations Lab

Understand feedback, learning, and inflation forecast accuracy. Basic: One interaction; ten periods with a fixed group; ten periods with reassignment across economies. Extended: Twenty-period reference and ten useful extensions, with fixed groups.

inflation expectationsforecastinglearningfeedbackuncertaintymacroeconomic dynamicsA22C92D84E31E37E71

Participants

Economy of six analysts; economy-period and individual forecast observations.

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Expected Utility and Risk Attitudes

Each student privately chooses between sure amounts and lotteries, and one completed decision is selected at random for payment. The basic version offers a focal choice or a ten-item certainty-equivalent list in fixed or random order. The extended version adds Holt–Laury lists, high stakes, random order, an Eckel–Grossman lottery menu, and an insurance choice.

riskexpected utilitycertainty equivalentrisk premiumpreference elicitationC91D80D81D91

Participants

Any number; each student decides individually and privately. No even number is required and there are no waits for anyone else.

Duration

3–12 min of activity depending on the configuration, plus 5 min for the reveal and about 15 min of discussion.

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Expert Information, Popularity and Reelection

Connect private information, policy choice, and continuation Basic: One encounter; ten with fixed or reassigned groups Extended: Eleven configurations per language

asymmetric informationelectoral evaluationpolicymaker competenceBayesian learningpublic advicepolitical delegationA22C92D72D82D83

Participants

Five-person group during a two-period encounter

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Externalities and Regulation

Four firms with heterogeneous production and clean-technology costs choose how much to produce and how many clean units to use; the remaining units create an environmental damage shared by the community. Allows comparing the unregulated outcome with different regulatory rules.

externalitiesenvironmental regulationpollutionPigouvian taxespermitsC92D62H23Q58

Participants

Community of four heterogeneous firms

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Federalism, Autonomy, and Territorial Inequality

Six participants form three regions and choose local investment and contributions to a shared fund. Compare regional or central voting, unequal resources, equalizing transfers, self-financed credit, bailout requests, external guarantees, and mobility with limited places. The report shows investment and contribution distributions, regional earnings, loan financing, and actual regional moves. Basic: One interaction or ten rounds with a fixed group or rematching. Extended: Eight treatments lasting six rounds with a fixed group.

fiscal federalismregional autonomypublic goodsterritorial inequalityfiscal bailoutsmobilityA22C72C92H73H77H81

Participants

One group of six, divided into three regions of two members.

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Financial Crisis and Real-Sector Transmission

Trace liquidation, bank capital and cash, new credit, firm investment and output. Basic: One episode; ten fixed-group episodes; ten episodes with role-preserving reassignment. Extended: Reference and fifteen contrasts of shocks, constraints, composition, protection, support tools, exposure, output and information.

financial crisesforced salesbank capitalliquidity and solvencycredit and productionpublic interventionA22C92E44G01G21G28

Participants

Nine-person two-bank economy: two managers, two investors, two deposit representatives, two firms and one authority.

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Fiscal Capacity Investment and Political Turnover

Study how political continuity and the distribution of returns shape current investment in fiscal capacity. Basic: One encounter, four encounters with a fixed pair and rotating roles, or four encounters with reassignment and rotating roles. Extended: Benchmark, likely turnover, inclusive benefits, secure government, persistent capacity, external finance, political competition, and discretionary use.

fiscal capacitypublic investmentpolitical turnovercommitmenttaxationpolitical economyA22C92D72H11H20

Participants

A pair consisting of Groups A and B, each represented by one participant.

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Fishery with Quotas

Four fishers with different costs choose catches in a dynamic fishery and face harvesting rights or limits defined by the institution. The basic version offers one or ten seasons with fixed or reassigned groups. The extended version compares individual and collective quotas, conservative and permissive limits, adaptive adjustment, transferable or auctioned quotas, and imperfect enforcement.

fisheriescatch quotasregulationrenewable resourcescomplianceC92Q22Q28

Participants

Fishing ground--season with four fishers

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Framing Effects

Participants receive different formulations of an equivalent problem, and the system compares choices across frames while holding the relevant economic structure constant. The basic version includes the Asian disease problem, gains and losses, and attribute frames. The extended version adds risky choice, goals, public policy, joint or separate presentation, order, percentages versus frequencies, and diagnostic batteries.

framing effectsinvariancedecisions under riskinformation presentationbehavioral economicsC91D81D91

Participants

Individual activity (no pairs, no wait pages). Any number of participants; six or more give balanced groups and interpretable denominators; if the comparison is central, a number divisible by two.

Duration

Approx. 8–12 min to answer and 20 min of discussion (one module); more for the full diagnostic.

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Futures Market (Hedging)

Producers and processors hold opposite exposures to an uncertain final price and trade, in a continuous market, promises to buy and sell that are cash-settled at the end of the period (selling short is allowed). Shows how trading lets people hedge a risk they already hold. One period or 8 periods, plus an extended version with chat.

futureshedgingspeculationderivativesexperimental financeC92D81G13G32

Participants

One market per session; about half producers and half processors. Works with any class size.

Duration

Approx. 20–25 min (eight periods with 2-minute trading), not counting discussion; with chat, up to 10 min more.

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Gift Exchange Game

The firm chooses a wage and the worker, after observing it, chooses effort: the firm earns 100 + 20e - w and the worker 30 + w - c(e). One round or ten rounds with a fixed or a reassigned partner, plus an extended version (nonbinding effort request, structured communication, exogenous wage, minimum wage, discretionary bonus, costly punishment, high or low productivity, social information, observable outcomes).

reciprocityincomplete contractsefficiency wageslabor marketsbehavioral economicsC91C92D91J31J41

Participants

Pairs (2 per group); an even number of participants is required. With reassigned partners, 20 or more students avoid repeated matches.

Duration

20–30 min (one round) · 40–60 min (ten rounds or an extended variant), including instructions and comprehension check.

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Grit and Long-Term Goals

gritperseverance of effortconsistency of interestself-reportslong-term goalsbehavioral economicsA22C83C91D91

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Growth Mindset

Measure beliefs about intelligence malleability and teach self-report scoring. Basic: Published three-item SPARQ/Dweck form, administered once. Extended: Published six-item Dweck/Blackwell form, without administering the basic form beforehand.

growth mindsetimplicit theories of intelligencemalleabilitylearningbelief measurementA22C83C91I21D84

Participants

Person; individual activity without matching or waiting.

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Heuristics and Belief Formation

Students answer individual judgment and probability problems to observe how salient information, descriptions, anchors, and sequences affect beliefs. The basic version covers representativeness, availability, and anchoring. The extended version adds small samples, the gambler's fallacy, Bayesian updating, conjunction, confirmation, calibration, and hindsight, as well as core and full diagnostic batteries.

heuristicsbelief formationjudgment biasesBayesian updatingbehavioral economicsC91D83D91

Participants

Individual activity (no pairs, no wait pages). Any number of participants; six or more give balanced arms and useful denominators (balanced assignment to two treatments).

Duration

Approx. 10–15 min to answer and 20–25 min of discussion (core); less for one module, more for the full diagnostic.

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HEXACO and Economic Decisions

personalityhonesty-humilitytrait measurementself-reportscooperationbehavioral economicsA22C83C91D91

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Hiring Market

Holt's classroom version (Veconlab, "Statistical Discrimination"; Fryer, Goeree and Holt, 2005) of the Coate and Loury (1993) model. Half the class decide whether to pay to train; the other half hire after seeing a colour (green or purple, with no other content) and a noisy test. The colours are identical, yet a belief about one colour can confirm itself. One round or 10 rounds, plus extended versions.

statistical discriminationlabour markethuman capitalself-confirming beliefsasymmetric informationC92D82J24J71

Participants

Any number. The whole class is one market: half are workers and half employers, with fixed roles; with an odd number, one employer evaluates two workers each round. With a single participant, the computer hires.

Duration

10 min (one round) · 25–30 min (10 rounds), not counting discussion.

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Hospital-Resident Matching

Compare mechanisms that assign people to institutions when both sides have preferences or priorities and a price cannot clear the market. Basic: Applicant-proposing deferred acceptance; one round, ten fixed-market rounds, or ten reassigned markets. Extended: Immediate acceptance, program-proposing DA, serial dictatorship, truncated lists, unequal capacities, and aligned preferences.

mechanism designmatchingdeferred acceptancemarkets without pricesexperimental economicsC78C92D47

Participants

A market of four applicants. Programs are automated institutional agents.

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Hotelling Spatial Competition

Study how firms selling a homogeneous product choose location and, in selected treatments, price when consumers compare delivered cost. Basic: One round, ten rounds with the same rival, or ten rounds with reassignment; common price and uniform demand. Extended: Concentrated demand, endogenous prices, quadratic travel costs, an outside option, asymmetric costs, and sequential location.

spatial competitionhorizontal differentiationlocation choiceprice competitionindustrial organizationC72C92D43L13

Participants

One market with two firms and a simulated population of consumers distributed on a street from 0 to 100.

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Hyperinflation, Money and Seigniorage

hyperinflationseignioragemoney demandoverlapping generationsinflation expectationsfiscal and monetary stabilizationA22C92D84E31E42E63

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ICAR Cognitive Reasoning

Teach cognitive performance measurement, scoring and limits of inference. Basic: Original 2014 ICAR-16: four items in each of four types. Extended: Original ICAR-60: 9 series, 16 verbal, 11 matrix and 24 rotation items. Each person receives one form.

cognitive reasoningcognitive abilityverbal reasoningspatial reasoningperformance measurementA22C83C91D91I21

Participants

Person; individual activity without matching or waiting.

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Identity and Belief Formation

Randomly assigned group labels support comparisons of decisions toward people sharing or differing in group identity. Includes resource allocation in one encounter or ten rounds with fixed or reassigned pairs, and extensions on trust, third-party sanctions and contact through conversation or a matched quiet pause. An individual module elicits beliefs and contrasts source identity and desirable outcomes. The report separates transfers, returns, sanctions and belief accuracy. Basic: One round; ten with fixed groups; ten with rematching. Extended: 10 configurations per language, including controls.

group identityfavoritismreciprocitythird-party punishmentbelief updatingincentivized elicitationA22C91C92D64D83D91

Participants

Pairs: minimum and multiple of eight participants; triads with C: minimum and multiple of twelve to balance labels. Individual beliefs: one or more people, without waits.

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Information Cascades

Show how people combine private signals with other people's public choices and why agreement may emerge even when private information is not fully aggregated. Basic: One sequence; ten sequences with a fixed group; ten sequences with reassigned groups. Extended: Nine variants covering history, transparency, precision, beliefs, information acquisition, conformity, and correction.

information cascadessocial learningBayesian updatingconformityinformation economicsC92D82D83

Participants

A group of six participants chooses in a known sequence. Each participant occupies one position per sequence.

Duration

20–30 minutes for one sequence with debrief; 50–80 minutes for ten sequences or a treatment comparison.

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Collective Information and Deliberation

Five members receive signals about an unknown state and vote for an alternative; the collective outcome determines their payoffs. Includes one decision, ten rounds with fixed or reassigned committees, and extensions on unanimity, heterogeneous precision, structured messages, conversation, public signals, correlated signals and conflicting objectives, plus an individual control. The report distinguishes collective accuracy, signal use, messages, state-specific errors and payoffs without treating a signal as a preference. Basic: One round; ten with fixed groups; ten with rematching. Extended: 11 configurations per language, including controls.

information aggregationvotingdeliberationcorrelated signalsstrategic votingconflicting interestsA22C72C92D71D72D83

Participants

Five people per committee; one per unit in the individual control. Rematching requires at least two complete committees.

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Political Blocking of Innovation

Explain why an authority may block a productive improvement threatening the rent associated with office. Basic: One encounter; ten with a fixed group; ten with random reassignment. Extended: Nine conditions: benchmark, protected continuity, low or high office value, guarantee, promise, competition, and two uncertainty conditions.

technological innovationpolitical replacementpolitical rentstechnology adoptioncompensationpolitical competitionA22C92D72O33O38O43

Participants

A group of three people with constant positions A, B, and C.

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Insolvency, Priority, and Creditor Distribution

Compare distribution rules and reorganization approval among creditors with different claims. Basic: One case; ten with fixed groups or rematching with stable roles. Extended: 9 conditions, including the reference; ten cases.

insolvencypriorityreorganizationcreditorsloss allocationC92K22G33

Participants

a group of 3 people per case

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Insurance Market

People with private risks decide whether to buy coverage, while the composition of those who insure determines costs, premiums, and market sustainability. The basic version offers one or ten rounds with fixed or reassigned markets. The extended version compares community rating, risk-based premiums, mandatory insurance, subsidies, penalties, reinsurance, experience-rated renewal, and a larger share of high-risk participants.

insuranceadverse selectionasymmetric informationriskpremiumsC92D82G22

Participants

A multiple of five, preserving one insurer and four consumers per market.

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Interest Groups, Mobilization and Electoral Information

Study verifiable information for policy and electorate selection Basic: Conditional information: one encounter, ten fixed, ten reassigned Extended: 23 treatments per language; 52 configurations and 4 rooms overall

interest groupselectoral mobilizationverifiable informationpolicy concessionscandidate selectionelectorate compositionA22C92D72D82

Participants

Group per encounter; automated citizen units in mobilization

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Investment Coordination and Demand Expectations

Examine how expectations about other companies affect investment profitability and joint activity. Basic: One interaction; ten periods with a fixed group; ten periods with reassigned groups. Extended: Benchmark and nine treatments: plans, public number, private information, public information, low or high productivity, temporary or permanent financed credits, and delayed results.

investmentstrategic complementarityexpectationscoordinationinformationeconomic policyA22C72C92D84E22

Participants

Six companies making simultaneous choices with symmetric roles.

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Competitive Labor Market

Firms and workers participate in a labor market where offers, costs, and productivity determine hiring, wages, surplus, and unemployment. The basic version offers one or ten rounds with fixed or reassigned markets. The extended version compares binding and nonbinding minimum wages, unemployment insurance, demand expansions or contractions, full information, and a minimum wage combined with insurance.

labor marketwagesemploymentsurplusminimum wageC92J20J31

Participants

A market of eight people: four firms and four workers.

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Job Search and the Beveridge Curve

Connect search, vacancies, separations, and unemployment with the Beveridge curve. Basic: One interaction; ten persistent periods; ten independent encounters with reassignment. Extended: Fifteen-period reference and thirteen parameter or institutional extensions.

job searchfrictional unemploymentvacanciesjob separationsmatchingBeveridge curveA22C92D83E24J63J64

Participants

Economy with four firms and twelve workers; economy period and individual decision.

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Legal Rules and Coordination

Examine how announcements, information, and execution guide coordination. Basic: One encounter, ten encounters with a fixed partner, or ten with reassigned partners; no announcement. Extended: Eleven configurations: priority, authority, private information, stability, reversal, conflicting criteria, and execution.

legal rulescoordinationfocal pointsexpectationsprivate informationsanctionsC72C92D83K42

Participants

Encounter between two participants with stable positions A and B.

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Legal and Fiscal Capacity

Connect legal and fiscal capacity to private investment and an endogenous tax base. Basic: One encounter, ten with fixed pairs, or ten with reassignment; positions remain fixed. Extended: Nine conditions: reference, inherited capacities, costs, partial coverage, appropriation, alternative activity, persistence, and turnover.

state capacityproperty rightsprivate investmenttax baseinstitutional complementaritypolitical turnoverA22C92H11H20O43P14

Participants

A pair in one encounter; repetition requires tracking people and pair identities.

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Legitimacy, Procedures, and Consent

Study how the origin of a rule, voice, social information, preference congruence, review, and representation relate to cooperation. Basic: One interaction, ten periods with a fixed group, or ten periods with reassigned groups. Extended: Benchmark, voice, individual information, congruence, appeal, and representation by lot.

institutional legitimacyinstitutional choicepublic goodscompliancevoicepolitical economyA22C92D02D72H41

Participants

A four-person group; in repeated designs, the fixed or reassigned group block is the natural comparison unit.

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Market for Lemons

Sellers know the quality of their goods and buyers decide how much to pay under complete or incomplete information, so the selection of goods offered can reduce trade. The basic version includes an individual diagnosis and markets lasting one or ten rounds. The extended version compares disclosure, quality standards, certification, warranties, reputation, and different shares of low-quality goods.

asymmetric informationadverse selectionqualitymarket for lemonsefficiencyC92D82L15

Participants

A multiple of eight in every configuration so the family can share one architecture.

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Leverage and Margin

Distinguish leverage, collateral constraints, liquidation and creditor recovery. Basic: One account; three initial-margin cases in fixed or random order. Extended: Thirteen conditions covering funding, collateral, execution and reserve rights.

leveragecollateralmargin callsposition liquidationcredit riskfunding constraintsC91G11G23

Participants

One person with an automated lender and exogenous prices; no pairing or waits.

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Accident Prevention and Civil Liability

Understand how liability, information and coverage affect prevention and risk allocation. Basic: No liability: one round, ten fixed-partner rounds or ten reassigned-partner rounds. Extended: Seven mechanisms and ten presets, including the reference and internal comparisons.

civil liabilityaccident preventionnegligencecompensationinsuranceasset recoveryC92D62D81K13

Participants

A real pair of two people; interactive activity.

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Strategic Entry and Limit Pricing

Strategic entry, limit pricing, asymmetric information, commitment, reputation, and competition policy. Basic: One round, ten periods with a fixed pair, and ten periods with reassigned counterparts under complete information. Extended: Complete information, hidden type, cheap mimicry, high entry cost, subsidy, capacity, reputation, and antitrust rule.

strategic entrylimit pricingsignalingentry deterrenceindustrial organizationA22C72C92D82L12L13

Participants

One incumbent and one potential entrant.

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Locus of Control (IE-4)

Explore internal and external control beliefs using IE-4 and distinguish them from action-outcome contingencies. Basic: Four IE-4 statements; published English and an unvalidated Spanish teaching translation. Extended: Same scale and four original hypothetical choices with positive, zero and negative contingencies.

locus of controlinternal and external controlaction–outcome contingencybeliefsdecisions under uncertaintyA22C83C91D81D84

Participants

Person; individual activity without matching or waiting.

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Integrated Economy: Labor, Production and Credit

Connect decisions and accounts in a closed economy Basic: One period; ten periods; twenty households Extended: Reference and thirteen mechanism changes

macroeconomic accountingemployment and productionbank creditinventories and investmentprices and expectationsfiscal and monetary policyA22C92E23E24E51E63

Participants

One fixed economy of 16 or 26 participants

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Enter or Stay Out

Classroom version of the market-entry game (Meyer et al., 1992; Holt, Veconlab): in fixed groups of 10, each person chooses to enter a market paying 100 − 10 × (entrants) or to stay out for 50. In equilibrium 4 or 5 enter, but the group would be better off with 2 or 3. One round or 10 rounds, plus versions with a fixed or voted entry fee.

market entrycongestionexternalitiescoordinationcorrective feesC92C72D62H23

Participants

Any number. Fixed groups of 10, formed at random; leftover participants join the first groups (31 → 11, 10 and 10). With fewer than 10, a single smaller group.

Duration

5–10 min (one round) · 15–20 min (10 rounds), not counting discussion.

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Matrices and Abstract Reasoning

relational reasoningvisual patternslearning from examplesperformance measurementexperimental designA22C91D83D91